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ABSTRACT 
Confronting persistent and widening inequality in educational 
opportunity, advocates have regarded the right to education as a linchpin 
for reform. In the forty years since the Supreme Court relegated that right 
to the domain of state constitutional law, its power has surged and faded in 
litigation challenging state school finance systems. Like so many of the 
students it is meant to protect, however, the right to education has 
generally underachieved, in part because those wielding it have not always 
appreciated its distinctive forms and function. 
Deconstructed, the right to education held by children has been 
formulated doctrinally as both a claim-right, imposing affirmative duties 
on the state to act, and an immunity, disabling certain state action. These 
two strands—oft-manifested as the claim-right to educational “adequacy” 
and an immunity entailing “equality” of educational opportunity—once 
considered irreconcilable, are actually interlocked by the right’s core 
historical function to protect children’s liberty and equality interests. 
And yet the right to education is ill equipped to fulfill its protection 
function. Education clauses in state constitutions do not fix the standards 
for mutually enforcing equality and adequacy. This encumbers already-
reluctant courts in addressing educational disparities and emboldens 
legislative resistance when they do. Appreciating that the right to education 
has a protection function entailing equality and liberty interests 
nevertheless suggests that the right can be adjudicated in a way that unifies 
the demands and guarantees of substantive due process and equal 
protection. That union holds the potential to ameliorate the enforcement 
standards thereby reconstituting the right to education as a mainstay of 
reform. 
INTRODUCTION 
The right to education is a constitutional aberration. Whittled by a 5–4 
Supreme Court majority in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez—as nonfundamental, ostensibly without rank in the U.S. 
Constitution1—the right persists explicitly in state constitutions. There it 
has been conscripted in the service of school finance litigation initiated in 
nearly every state but has failed to usher in the lasting reforms sought by 
advocates.2 Rather, the fallout from the 1973 Rodriguez opinion has been 
 
1.  See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). 
2.  See Derek Black, Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions with Equal Protection: The First 
Step Toward Education as a Federally Protected Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1360–73 
(2010) (recounting successes and failures of school finance cases in state courts). 
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so desultory that this once-nascent entitlement appears somewhat of an 
ugly duckling of constitutional rights—stuck, alas, in a forty-year-plus ugly 
phase. The prospect that the right to education will mature into a proverbial 
swan is dim, and yet, for many it remains an irresistible vision. 
Scholars have imagined various transformations of the right to advance 
its constitutional station.3 Some propose petitioning the Court to overrule 
Rodriguez and recognize a fundamental right to “equal educational 
opportunity,” implicating the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause.4 They insist that such a conversion is not as improbable as it seems 
given the federal government’s increased role in education since Rodriguez 
and the Court’s subsequent precedent.5  
Others suggest that the Court should, if not overrule, at least revisit 
Rodriguez because it did not properly consider alternative bases for the 
right, e.g., the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, the implied right to 
vote, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Privileges and 
Immunities Clauses;6 the Citizenship Clause;7 or the Ninth Amendment.8 
Perhaps unconvinced that courts will rely on any of these sources to 
find the right implicit in the text, “groups of scholars, advocates, legal 
institutions, and communities have been theorizing and organizing a 
grassroots movement to amend the Constitution” to make the right 
 
3.  See id. at 1378–82 (reviewing previously proposed strategies for establishing a right to 
education in the U.S. Constitution). 
4.  Christopher R. Lockard, Note, In the Wake of Williams v. State: The Past, Present, and 
Future of Education Finance Litigation in California, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 385, 420–21 (2005–2006) 
(noting Berkeley Law professors’ “Rethinking Rodriguez” project, which considered “mounting a 
school finance lawsuit based on federal constitutional rights with the hope of overruling 
Rodriguez . . . to make education a fundamental right” (footnote omitted)); cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, The 
Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 111, 121–23 (2004) (concluding that 
Rodriguez was “tragically wrong”). 
5.  See, e.g., Sarah G. Boyce, Note, The Obsolescence of San Antonio v. Rodriguez in the Wake 
of the Federal Government’s Quest to Leave No Child Behind, 61 DUKE L.J. 1025 (2012); Kerry P. 
Burnet, Note, Never a Lost Cause: Evaluating School Finance Litigation in the Face of Continuing 
Education Inequality in Post-Rodriguez America, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1225; see also Black, supra note 
2, at 1361, 1406 (contending that Rodriguez need not be overruled directly because state education 
cases have “broaden[ed] the concept of equity to include a substantive component” such that federal 
equal protection is implicated when states provide one set of students an adequate education but deny it 
to others). 
6.  See Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. 
Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 550, 553 
(1992). 
7.  See Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 330, 
394 (2006); see also Kara A. Millonzi, Education as a Right of National Citizenship Under the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1286, 1288 (2003) 
(“Because the early history of the Privileges or Immunities Clause indicates that the clause was 
designed to protect rights of national citizenship, the clause is potentially a more appropriate 
constitutional source for protecting the right to education than the Equal Protection Clause.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
8.  See DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE 153 (2007). 
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explicit.9 Most other commentators nevertheless encourage a more modest 
approach, to take what Rodriguez gives (by leaving undecided)—the 
possibility of a federal constitutional right to a “minimally adequate 
education.”10 Still others think that the solution is for Congress to bypass 
Rodriguez and the U.S. Constitution altogether and enact a federal statutory 
right to education.11 
An intensifying minority of scholars caution against federalizing the 
right to education12 or are resigned to working within the state 
constitutional framework, from which nearly all of the right’s jurisprudence 
has evolved in the four decades since Rodriguez.13 Scott Bauries, for 
 
9.  See Black, supra note 2, at 1381 (citing campaigns to amend U.S. Constitution). 
10.  See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36 (suggesting possibility that “some identifiable quantum of 
education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of [First Amendment 
freedoms and the right to vote]”); see, e.g., Julius Chambers, Adequate Education for All: A Right, an 
Achievable Goal, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 55, 67–72 (1987); Edward B. Foley, Rodriguez 
Revisited: Constitutional Theory and School Finance, 32 GA. L. REV. 475, 480 (1998); Barry Friedman 
& Sara Solow, The Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 92 (2013); 
Thomas J. Walsh, Education as a Fundamental Right Under the United States Constitution, 29 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 279, 281–87 (1993); Matthew A. Brunell, Note, What Lawrence Brought for 
“Show and Tell”: The Non-Fundamental Liberty Interest in a Minimally Adequate Education, 25 B.C. 
THIRD WORLD L.J. 343 (2005); Lauren Nicole Gillespie, Note, The Fourth Wave of Education Finance 
Litigation: Pursuing a Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1016 
(2010); Timothy D. Lynch, Note, Education as a Fundamental Right: Challenging the Supreme Court’s 
Jurisprudence, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 953 (1998); cf. Michael A. Rebell, The Right to Comprehensive 
Educational Opportunity, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 47, 47 (2012) (advocating statutory and 
constitutional bases for a “right to comprehensive educational opportunity” in the No Child Left Behind 
Act and in the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, including the adequacy issue left open in 
Rodriguez). 
11.  See, e.g., Christopher Edley, Jr., Keynote Address, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 151 (2008) (calling 
for new academic approach to educational rights as fundamental civil rights, focusing on 
subconstitutional statutory means of rights definition, establishment, and enforcement); Kimberly 
Jenkins Robinson, The Case for a Collaborative Enforcement Model for a Federal Right to Education, 
40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1653, 1712–16 (2007) (urging Congress to recognize federal right to education, 
enact it through spending legislation, and enforce it by federal panel); see also Derek W. Black, The 
Congressional Failure to Enforce Equal Protection Through the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 313, 321 (2010) (proposing modification of Title I’s funding to remedy inequitable 
disparities in educational funding and “restore the federal government to its proper role as a leader in 
education equality”). 
12. See Black, supra note 2, at 1384–85 (citing Paul L. Tractenberg, The Refusal To “Federalize” 
the Quest for Equal Educational Opportunity, the Role of State Courts and the Impact of Different State 
Constitutional Theories 30 (Apr. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/ 
tranctenberg_paper.pdf; Daniel S. Greenspahn, A Constitutional Right to Learn: The Uncertain Allure 
of Making a Federal Case out of Education, 59 S.C. L. REV. 755, 772 (2008)). 
13.  See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 
VAND. L. REV. 101, 108–09 (1995); Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and 
the “Third Wave”: From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151 (1995); Allen W. Hubsch, The 
Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1325 (1992); Robert 
M. Jensen, Advancing Education Through Education Clauses of State Constitutions, 1997 BYU EDUC. 
& L.J. 1; Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 307, 308–17 (1991); Laurie Reynolds, Full State Funding of Education as a State 
Constitutional Imperative, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 749 (2009); William E. Thro, The Role of Language of the 
State Education Clauses in School Finance Litigation, 79 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 19 (1993); Deborah A. 
Verstegen, Towards a Theory of Adequacy: The Continuing Saga of Equal Educational Opportunity in 
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instance, analyzes the nature of the “right” to education under state 
constitutions, examining how it diverges or converges with federal 
doctrine14 and prescribing principles for its adjudication.15 
Yet even “the state constitutional right to education is in danger of 
being rendered meaningless” due to lingering doubts about its justiciability 
and the increasing reluctance of courts to order remediation in the face of 
legislative deficiencies or outright defiance.16 School funding cases have 
long been laden with separation of powers concerns, causing some courts 
to abdicate their role entirely. Other courts previously willing to intervene 
have begun to demur, faced with the prospect of enforcing the right in ways 
that might continuously encroach on legislative prerogatives.17 
Hence, despite decades of school funding litigation and the vast 
literature annotated above, the right to education remains conceptually 
fragmented. I do not wish to add another voice to this dissonant chorus by 
attempting to blueprint an entirely new edifice for the right. Rather, in this 
Article I deconstruct the right’s present, much-maligned composition to 
gain clarity about the legal architectures that have already been conceived 
and operationalized. In so doing, I show how two strands of the right to 
education once thought to be diametrically opposed—equality of 
educational opportunity and educational adequacy—are interlocked 
through the right’s forms and functions. 
In Part I, I evaluate the right to education’s forms—privilege, claim-
right, power, and immunity—within Hohfeld’s analytic scheme of rights.18 
 
the Context of State Constitutional Challenges to School Finance Systems, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 499 (2004); Josh Kagan, Note, A Civics Action: Interpreting “Adequacy” in State Constitutions’ 
Education Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2241 (2003); see also Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and 
State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1138, 1168 
(1999). 
14.  See Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of Educational 
Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REV. 701, 741 (2010) 
[hereinafter Bauries, Judicial Review of Adequacy]; Scott R. Bauries, State Constitutions and Individual 
Rights: Conceptual Convergence in School Finance Litigation, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 301 (2011) 
[hereinafter Bauries, Conceptual Convergence]. 
15.  See Scott R. Bauries, A Common Law Constitutionalism for the Right to Education, 48 GA. 
L. REV. 949 (2014) [hereinafter Bauries, Common Law Constitutionalism]; Scott R. Bauries, The 
Education Duty, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 736 (2012) [hereinafter Bauries, Education Duty]. 
16.  Julia A. Simon-Kerr & Robynn K. Sturm, Justiciability and the Role of Courts in Adequacy 
Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 83, 87 (2010). 
17.  Id. at 96–97. 
18.  See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 710 (1917); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). These two articles were later 
combined in a book following Hohfeld’s death. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL 
LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919) 
[hereinafter HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS]. 
1 WEISHART 915-978 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/19/2016  1:43 PM 
2016] Reconstituting the Right to Education 921 
Hohfeld’s framework is ubiquitous,19 “the ‘standard model’ of legal 
rights,”20 and renowned as “a canonical landmark in American 
jurisprudence.”21 Although Hohfeld is not without his critics,22 his scheme 
“has withstood the test of time.”23 More importantly, some courts have 
utilized Hohfeld’s framework for analyzing legal rights24—including, 
significantly, two state supreme courts, which did so explicitly in 
interpreting their state constitutions’ education clauses.25 
Coding the right to education’s forms only reveals part of its nature, 
however.26 The form provides a descriptor of the right’s “internal 
structure.”27 But to fit our ordinary understanding of what it means to have 
a legal right, we also need a descriptor of “what rights do for those who 
hold them,” i.e., their function.28 Leif Wenar identifies six functions—
exemption, discretion, authorization, provision, performance, and 
 
19.  See Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 306 (“Numerous articles and books 
have employed Hohfeld’s framework since it was first introduced.”). 
20.  Steven M. Wise, Hardly a Revolution—the Eligibility of Nonhuman Animals for Dignity-
Rights in a Liberal Democracy, 22 VT. L. REV. 793, 800–01 (1998) (observing that Hohfeld’s 
framework “was adopted by various Restatements of the Law, as well as by Black’s Law Dictionary”); 
see Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND’s Forever: Standards, Patent Transfers, and Licensing 
Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231, 289 (2014) (observing that Hohfeld’s “hundred-year-old article is so 
widely read and referenced that it landed a spot at number fifty in Shapiro and Pearse’s recent study 
ranking the one hundred most-cited law review articles”). 
21.  Allen Thomas O’Rourke, Refuge from a Jurisprudence of Doubt: Hohfeldian Analysis of 
Constitutional Law, 61 S.C. L. REV. 141, 144 (2009); see HILLEL STEINER, AN ESSAY ON RIGHTS 59 
(1994) (“The beginning of wisdom [on contemporary discussions of rights] is widely agreed to be the 
classification of juridical positions developed by Wesley N. Hohfeld.”); Matthew H. Kramer, Rights in 
Legal and Political Philosophy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 414, 415 (Keith E. 
Whittington et al. eds., 2008) (“The most famous and influential analysis of legal rights ever 
propounded is that developed by the American jurist Wesley Hohfeld . . . .”). 
22.  See Matthew H. Kramer, Rights Without Trimmings, in A DEBATE OVER RIGHTS: 
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRIES 7, 7 n.1 (Matthew H. Kramer et al. eds., 1998) (citing criticisms); Joseph 
William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 
WIS. L. REV. 975, 989–93, 989 n.22 (describing central criticisms and legal rights debates spurred in 
response to Hohfeld’s framework). 
23.  See Kramer, supra note 21, at 417. 
24.  See, e.g., Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 544 F.3d 279, 280 n.1 (3d Cir. 2008); United States ex 
rel. Virani v. Jerry M. Lewis Truck Parts & Equip., Inc., 89 F.3d 574, 577 (9th Cir. 1996), abrogated by 
Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010); Cal. Grocers Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, 254 P.3d 1019, 1033 
n.10 (Cal. 2011); State v. Goldberg, 85 A.3d 231, 243–44, 243 n.17 (Md. 2014); Yu v. Paperchase 
P’ship, 845 P.2d 158, 163–65 (N.M. 1992). 
25.  See McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 527 n.23 (Mass. 1993) 
(“[I]f legislatures and magistrates have a constitutional duty to educate, then members of the 
Commonwealth have a correlative constitutional right to be educated.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 91 (Wash. 1978) (“Flowing from this 
constitutionally imposed ‘duty’ [to make ample provision for education] is its jural correlative, a 
correspondent ‘right’ permitting control of another’s conduct.” (footnote omitted)). 
26.  And fortunately Bauries has laid much of that groundwork. See Bauries, Conceptual 
Convergence, supra note 14, at 306–21. 
27.  Leif Wenar, Rights, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (July 2, 2011), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ fall2011/entries/rights. 
28.  Id. 
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protection—which, when paired with one or more forms, provide a 
complete description of the right’s “complex ‘molecular’ . . . structure.”29  
The practical implications of this description are quite serious because 
the right’s forms and functions dictate the scope of judicial review and the 
remedial measures that courts can undertake. Put simply, they predetermine 
the right’s potential strength and viability. 
My analysis in Part I concludes that the right to education held by 
children has taken the form of both a claim-right and an immunity. Where 
the two forms overlap—the protection function—the claim-right denotes a 
right to educational adequacy, and the immunity is one of equality of 
educational opportunity.30 Although the protection function has not 
attracted much scholarly attention, the right has long been justified and 
invoked to protect children from political, economic, and social inequalities 
and more generally to protect their capabilities to be responsible, 
productive citizens. 
Broadly construed, such equality and liberty interests are underwritten 
by the equality and adequacy principles I explore further in Part II. At the 
core of the principle of educational adequacy is the notion that we must 
cultivate children’s positive liberties. Whereas the distributive principle of 
equality of educational opportunity has been utilized to negate resource 
inequities and social inequalities. Despite the potential of adequacy and 
equality intertwined,31 education clauses in state constitutions do not fix 
standards for their mutual enforcement, leaving the right to education 
vulnerable to the charge that it is judicially unmanageable. 
Disjoined, equal protection and substantive due process offer little 
recourse, each being jurisprudentially flawed: equal protection demanding 
substantive equality poses its own intractable manageability problems, 
rendering it inadequate. Substantive due process, as a noncomparative 
right, tolerates and potentially exasperates, objectionable inequities. 
Conjoined, the egalitarian principles of equal protection and the substantive 
demands of due process might overcome these flaws, but exactly how they 
can be integrated remains unclear, even after the Court’s recent application 
in Obergefell v. Hodges.32 
I make no pretense that a grand unifying theory is viable or even 
desirable. Nevertheless, the right to education—an immunity-claim-right 
imparting a protection function vis-à-vis children’s liberty and equality 
 
29.  Leif Wenar, The Nature of Rights, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 225 (2005). 
30.  “Equality of educational opportunity has been thought to require equal spending per pupil or 
spending adjusted to the needs of differently situated children. Adequacy has been understood to require 
a level of spending sufficient to satisfy some absolute, rather than relative, educational threshold.” 
Joshua E. Weishart, Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. 477, 477 (2014). 
31.  See generally id. 
32.  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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interests—presents a configuration that could make unifying substantive 
due process and equal protection more palpable. That union could, in turn, 
ameliorate the standards for enforcing the right to education. On the one 
hand, substantive due process advancing positive liberty interests reinforces 
the adequacy threshold from which resource inequities can be judicially 
measured and adjusted; on the other hand, equal protection can infuse equal 
educational opportunity principles in translating adequacy as a relational 
demand. 
I. THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION’S “MOLECULAR STRUCTURE” 
In human rights discourse, the right to education is a Johnny-come-
lately.33 Although the right formally arrived on the international scene in 
1948 via the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),34 it was 
consigned with other so-called “second-generation” human rights—
economic, social, and cultural rights—behind “first-generation” political 
and civil rights.35 In the course of a few decades, however, human rights 
discourse has gradually expanded to include second-generation rights.36 
And the right to education figures prominently in that discussion.37 In fact, 
“[t]he right to education is the most widely enshrined [socio-economic 
right], present in more than three-quarters of the world’s constitutions.”38 
Notwithstanding the burgeoning human rights discourse, the Supreme 
Court has observed that the UDHR is nonbinding,39 and the United States is 
among the few industrialized nations that failed to ratify the two treaties 
that explicitly recognize a right to education, the International Covenant on 
 
33.  See generally Leah K. McMillan, What’s in a Right? Two Variations for Interpreting the 
Right to Education, 56 INT’L REV. EDUC. 531 (2010). 
34.  See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III), art. 26(1) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be 
free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory.”). 
35.  See J. Oloka-Onyango, Reinforcing Marginalized Rights in an Age of Globalization: 
International Mechanisms, Non-State Actors, and the Struggle for Peoples’ Rights in Africa, 18 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 851, 852–55 (2003) (explaining that second-generation rights “have been relegated to a 
lower[,] less important sphere” and “are as much marginalized in the discourse[] as they are in the 
enforcement”). 
36.  See id. at 854; Nisha Thapliyal et al.,”Until We Get Up Again to Fight”: Education Rights 
and Participation in South Africa, 57 COMP. EDUC. REV. 212, 213 (2013). 
37.  See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS IN EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND CULTURE (Yvonne Donders & 
Vladimir Volodin eds., 2007); JOEL SPRING, THE UNIVERSAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION: JUSTIFICATION, 
DEFINITION, AND GUIDELINES (2000). 
38.  Courtney Jung et al., Economic and Social Rights in National Constitutions, 62 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 1043, 1053 (2014); see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Human Rights, Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education para. 
66, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/52 (Jan. 11, 2001) (observing explicit guarantees of right to education in 
142 of 186 countries surveyed). 
39.  See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004) (“[T]he Declaration does not of its 
own force impose obligations as a matter of international law.”). 
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Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child.40 Even if customary international law yet obligates the United 
States to discern and enforce a right to education,41 that recognition would 
not give the right any “constitutional stature”—the right “would merely 
become federal law[,] which could be superseded by subsequent 
contradictory federal legislation or treaty law.”42 Hence, although the 
development of the international human right to education can inform our 
analysis, it cannot dictate the scope of this domestic, constitutional-level 
inquiry. 
As previously noted, there is no dearth of scholarship formulating the 
right to education under American law. Indeed, rights-based “claims about 
education reform enjoy a resurgence in [our] political discourse.”43 Yet, 
“current scholarship has mostly produced very general descriptions of 
education rights, but little critical analysis of whether these general 
conceptions are logically sound or normatively desirable.”44 Rather than 
query the nature of the right itself, much of the literature assumes it is a 
“positive right” and focuses on its “quantitative and qualitative 
entitlements” or its enforcement, that is, its “justiciability and 
remediability.”45 A conceptually thin account of the right, however, further 
obscures its content and complicates problems with its enforcement.46 
Although Bauries has made significant inroads to fill this “theoretical 
void,”47 I reconsider his account of the right to education’s forms and 
venture further, to chart the right’s functions. Together, the forms and 
functions provide a complete picture of the right’s structure. 
A. The Right to Education’s Forms 
Although Hohfeld aimed to clarify and, in a sense, simplify the term 
“right,” his scheme of rights is quite intricate.48 Generations of scholars 
 
40.  See Angela Avis Holland, Note, Resolving the Dissonance of Rodriguez and the Right to 
Education: International Human Rights Instruments as a Source of Repose for the United States, 41 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 229, 245–50 (2008). 
41.  See id. at 254. 
42.  Bitensky, supra note 6, at 618–19. 
43.  ANNE NEWMAN, REALIZING EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS 60 (2013). 
44.  Bauries, Judicial Review of Adequacy, supra note 14, at 755–56; see id. at 758 & n.274 
(citing “a few notable exceptions”). 
45.  See Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 303–04. 
46.  Cf. id. at 304 (“[B]oth scholarship and adjudication of education rights and responsibilities 
would be improved by a better understanding of which conceptions are actually at work in the cases.”). 
47.  See generally Bauries, Judicial Review of Adequacy, supra note 14. 
48.  See GEORGE W. RAINBOLT, THE CONCEPT OF RIGHTS 11–17 (2006); Eric Engle, Taking the 
Right Seriously: Hohfeldian Semiotics and Rights Discourse, 3 CRIT 84, 95 (2010) (“Hohfeld proposes 
a potentially infinite and, in all events, complex typology.”). For a sophisticated treatment of 
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have sought to recapitulate or refine his taxonomy. Because this ground has 
been covered numerous times before, we can forgo a lengthy discussion of 
the framework in the abstract; an abridged review of the Hohfeldian 
lexicon should facilitate a basic understanding of how courts have 
understood the right to education’s forms in practice. 
When we use the word “right” in a legal sense, we may have in mind 
one (or more) of four distinct entitlements: (1) claim-right, (2) privilege, (3) 
power, or (4) immunity.49 Each of these four “Hohfeldian incidents” has a 
“jural correlative,” which together comprise a legal relationship between 
two or more parties.50 So, for instance, if Emma has a claim-right to 
education against the state, then the state has a jural correlative duty to 
Emma to educate her. If, however, Emma holds a privilege against the state 
regarding her education, then the state has a correlative no-right to interfere 
with Emma’s education (and indeed, Emma has no duty to the state even to 
be educated). The claim-right and privilege are “first-order” rights in that 
they are rights one has “over objects such as one’s body.”51 
Powers and immunities are “second-order” (read higher order), 
considered “[r]ights over rights.”52 That is, they describe “the various ways 
in which people [or entities] can manipulate the first-order [rights].”53 If the 
state holds a power, it is authorized to create, waive, or annul its own 
claim-right or privilege or Emma’s claim-right or privilege, and thus, 
Emma is under a correlative liability to the state’s power.54 However, if 
Emma holds an immunity, then the state is under a correlative disability, 
 
Hohfeldian relations as a basis for deontic logic, see Kevin W. Saunders, A Formal Analysis of 
Hohfeldian Relations, 23 AKRON L. REV. 465 (1990). 
49.  Scholars have taken issue with Hohfeld’s terminology. Some prefer the term “liberty” instead 
of “privilege,” see, e.g., Glanville Williams, The Concept of Legal Liberty, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 1129, 
1131–35 (1956), and “claim-right” or “claim” instead of “right,” see, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon & Daniel 
Bahls, The Public’s Right to Fair Use: Amending Section 107 to Avoid the “Fared Use” Fallacy, 2007 
UTAH L. REV. 619, 625 n.26 (“[C]ommentators tend to use the phrase ‘claim right’ . . . to preserve the 
simple term ‘right,’ with its rich connotative range, for more general applicability.”); O’Rourke, supra 
note 21, at 145 n.27 (using “claim” as distinct from the “broader, popular usage” of “right”). To avoid 
confusion, I employ the terms used by both Bauries and Wenar. 
50.  To simplify matters further, we can omit a discussion of the “jural opposites,” which are 
merely negations of the four Hohfeldian incidents. The opposites are “inessential”—the Hohfeldian 
incidents and their correlatives “cover all the conceptual material” needed to elucidate the right to 
education’s forms. Cf. Frank I. Michelman, “There Have To Be Four”, 64 MD. L. REV. 136, 156 
(2005). 
51.  Wenar, supra note 29, at 233. Claim-rights and privileges form what H.L.A. Hart referred to 
as “primary rules”—rules requiring people “to do or abstain from certain actions, whether they wish to 
or not.” H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 81 (3d ed. 2012). 
52.  Wenar, supra note 29, at 233. 
53.  Rowan Cruft, Rights: Beyond Interest Theory and Will Theory?, 23 LAW & PHIL. 347, 350 
(2004). Following Hart, powers and immunities are thus “secondary rules” because they allow people to 
“introduce new rules of the primary type, extinguish or modify old ones, or in various ways determine 
their incidence or control their operations.” HART, supra note 51, at 81. 
54.  See Cruft, supra note 53, at 350–51. 
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and thus, the state has no power to create, waive, or annul its own claim-
right or privilege or Emma’s claim-right or privilege.55 In short, second-
order rights either allow or disallow a party to change her own or another 
party’s legal relations. 
 
Table A. Hohfeld’s Jural Correlatives. 
 
First-order 
A’s claim-right ↔ B’s duty 
A’s privilege ↔ B’s no-right 
Second-order 
A’s power ↔ B’s liability 
A’s immunity ↔ B’s disability 
 
Until recently, commentators had been reluctant to describe Hohfeld’s 
Jural Correlatives in the context of a constitutional-level right and the legal 
relationship the right establishes between citizen and state.56 That is 
because “Hohfeld developed his framework to describe private legal 
relationships, and the Hohfeld system has, during most of its existence, 
been applied solely to private law questions,” e.g., property, contracts, 
torts.57 But several scholars have now demonstrated that the framework can 
be applied to public law questions as well.58 Moreover, earlier criticism that 
the framework could not account for the correlativity between public law 
duties and rights59 has been effectively rebutted. The criticism “is plainly 
wrong if the constitutional status of the state as a rights bearer is 
acknowledged”—public duties are those “owed to the state as representing 
the citizens.”60 We will return to this point later. 
 
55.  See id. 
56.  See Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 306. 
57.  Id. at 308–09 (footnote omitted); see O’Rourke, supra note 21, at 142 n.8 (citing works 
characterizing Hohfeld’s framework as applicable to “private law” and “common law”). 
58.  See Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 309 & n.32, 311 (citing scholars 
“applying the Hohfeld framework in constitutional law” and finding O’Rourke’s defense of that 
application “very convincing”); O’Rourke, supra note 21, at 154–70; see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, 
Incorporation of the Establishment Clause Against the States: A Logical, Textual, and Historical 
Account, 88 IND. L.J. 669, 694 & n.160 (2013) (citing scholarship in suggesting that “Hohfeldian 
analysis is common in contemporary constitutional literature”). See generally H. Newcomb Morse, 
Applying the Hohfeld System to Constitutional Analysis, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 639 (1988). 
59.  See ALAN R. WHITE, RIGHTS 62–63 (1984)); Ronen Perry, Correlativity, 28 LAW & PHIL. 
537, 541–42 (2009) (citing Nigel E. Simmonds, Introduction to WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, 
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING (David Campbell & Philip 
Thomas eds., 2001)); see also J.W. HARRIS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 81–83 (1980). 
60.  SURI RATNAPALA, JURISPRUDENCE 348 (2d ed. 2013); see also Perry, supra note 59, at 544 
(“A possible answer [to the criticism] is that the correlativity axiom encompasses collective legal 
positions, including collective rights. Under this view, a public duty is owed to a collectivity which 
holds the correlative right, be it a distinct class of persons, the public at large, or the state.” (citing 
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Let us now consider the right to education’s forms utilizing the 
Hohfeldian framework.61 
1. A “Power” Held by the State 
The right to education does not take the form of a Hohfeldian power 
held by children. No law entitles children to create, waive, or annul their 
own or anyone else’s claim-rights or privileges with respect to public 
education. That is, no child is empowered to alter her or another’s legal 
relations regarding publicly funded and regulated education. 
Rather, the second-order power to amend first-order legal relationships 
regarding education is held almost exclusively by the state.62 In fact, “[t]he 
overwhelming majority of state constitutions give the state plenary power 
over the education of its children.”63 And as Bauries observes, in states 
where courts have held that the right to education is nonjusticiable, the 
legislature has a “nearly unlimited Hohfeldian power” that is, in practice, 
“virtually unreviewable.”64 
In the majority of states where the right to education is justiciable, 
Bauries explains that courts have taken one of three paths in resolving 
school finance challenges. Bauries believes that the first two paths 
demonstrate that state courts have mainly conceived the right to education 
 
Kramer, supra note 22, at 59)); cf. Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 
13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 18, 27 (1993) (“The term correlative to the [constitutional] claim-right is of 
course the duty incumbent upon officials and others to respect and uphold the right. And the term 
correlative to the constitutional immunity is what Hohfeld would call a disability: in effect, a disabling 
of the legislature from its normal functions of revision, reform and innovation in the law.”). 
61.  The following analysis builds on, supplements, and amends Bauries’s scholarship which 
“analyzes the population of reported cases from the highest state courts to identify Hohfeldian 
conceptions of education rights held or applied by state courts.” Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, 
supra note 14, at 305. 
62.  The people, of course, retain the power to amend the U.S. Constitution in a manner 
conforming with Article V and to amend their respective state constitution. See G. ALAN TARR, 
UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 74 (1998) (noting state constitutions commonly include “an 
explicit recognition that political power came from the people,” and that such provisions clarified “that 
the people did not require amendment or . . . provisions to change the constitution” because they 
presumed existence of such power and “merely specified a procedure by which it could be exercised”). 
63.  John Schomberg, Equity v. Autonomy: The Problems of Private Donations to Public Schools, 
1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 143, 176; accord Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under 
State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1325, 1329 (1992) (tallying forty-two state constitutions 
that grant states plenary power over education); see also Christopher P. Lu, Note, Liberator or Captor: 
Defining the Role of the Federal Government in School Finance Reform, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 543, 
546 (1991) (“[T]he states possess ‘plenary power’ over education, despite having ‘delegat[ed] 
considerable educational policymaking authority to local agencies.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Project, Education and the Law: State Interests and Individual Rights, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1373, 1375–77 
(1976))). 
64.  Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 340–42 (citing state court decisions in 
Rhode Island, Alaska, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Alabama, Florida, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Illinois). 
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as a Hohfeldian power held by the legislature.65 Along these two paths, 
courts either (1) construe the right to education utilizing judicially created 
standards but then abstain from ordering remediation directed at the 
legislature due to “separation of powers concerns”66 or (2) order 
remediation but only after adopting the “legislatively developed 
standard[s].”67 
In either case, although the language of the state constitutions and the 
opinions of the highest courts couch the right to education as a claim-right 
held by children correlative to a duty imposed on the state, Bauries thinks 
the deference accorded to the legislature at the merits review or remedial 
stages suggests otherwise—“that the courts are actually acting on 
conceptions of their education clauses as sources of legislative powers, not 
duties.”68 I raise some doubts about this assertion later, but accepting 
Bauries’s framing for now, it should not be surprising or troubling. 
It may seem counterintuitive to think of the right to education as a right 
that empowers the state and places children under a correlative liability. 
But the notion that a state must be so empowered to protect children’s well-
being can be traced to the very beginnings of public education systems in 
the United States. It stems from the view that children are not fully 
autonomous agents—a recognition that states have long used to justify 
“parens patriae authority to intercede in the lives of children in order to 
protect their safety, to promote their education, or otherwise to further their 
best interests” when their parents or guardians have failed to do so.69 
The parens patriae doctrine “has governed American policy toward 
children and families for two centuries.”70 “Consider the variety of these 
child-saving efforts: public schools, orphanages, reformatories, 
psychological testing, vocational guidance, Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC), day-care centers, and parenting classes—to name just a 
few.”71 Regarding public schools in particular, states “have relied on the 
parens patriae doctrine in enacting compulsory-education laws” dating 
 
65.  See id. at 340. 
66.  Id. at 343–46 (citing state court decisions in Kentucky, Ohio, South Carolina, New 
Hampshire, Vermont, Montana, Idaho, and Arizona). 
67.  Id. at 346–49 (citing state court decisions in Kansas, Georgia, Missouri, Oregon, and 
Indiana). 
68.  Id. at 343. 
69.  Anne C. Dailey, Children’s Constitutional Rights, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2099, 2106–12 (2011). 
70.  David F. Labaree, Parens Patriae: The Private Roots of Public Policy Toward Children, 26 
HIST. EDUC. Q. 111, 112 (1986) (reviewing W. NORTON GRUBB & MARVIN LAZERSON, BROKEN 
PROMISES (1982)); see also Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United 
States, 136 U.S. 1, 60 n.1 (1890) (“Instances of this kind of legislation, in which the legislature clearly 
acts as parens patriae, may be found almost without number.”). 
71.  Labaree, supra note 70, at 111. 
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back to at least the nineteenth century.72 States have also invoked that 
common law doctrine together with their general police powers73 to hold 
children liable under truancy laws74 and discipline them for their 
misconduct in school.75 
As the Supreme Court has explained, concurrent with the state’s parens 
patriae power is the state’s duty to act in the interest of the child and the 
public.76 “The concept of parens patriae is derived from the English 
constitutional system” wherein “the King retained certain duties and 
powers . . . as guardian of persons under legal disabilities to act for 
themselves.”77 In America, states were “vested with the historic parens 
patriae power, including the duty to protect” such persons.78 Parens 
patriae has thus been “defined by many states as more than just a [power], 
but also a duty to protect the interests of children.”79 The state’s duty to 
protect children through education in particular emanates from “the natural 
duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in 
life.”80 
 
72.  See Gregory Thomas, Limitations on Parens Patriae: The State and the Parent/Child 
Relationship, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 51, 57 (2007); see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 
158, 166 (1944) (“[T]he state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by requiring school 
attendance . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
73.  “Since it is difficult to distinguish the two sources of power in this context, commentators 
suggest that ‘the authority of the state to oversee the child’s education is founded upon both’ the parens 
patriae power and the police power of the states.” Lisa M. Lukasik, Comment, The Latest Home 
Education Challenge: The Relationship Between Home Schools and Public Schools, 74 N.C. L. REV. 
1913, 1944 (1996) (quoting James C. Easterly, Comment, “Parent v. State”: The Challenge to 
Compulsory School Attendance Laws, 11 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y. 83, 89 (1990)). 
74.  See Annette Ruth Appell, Accommodating Childhood, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 715, 
759–60, 765 (2013). Or, by extension, parents and legal guardians can be held liable for their children’s 
truancy. See generally Janet Stroman, Holding Parents Liable for Their Children’s Truancy, 5 U.C. 
DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 47 (2000). 
75.  See Cecelia M. Espenoza, Good Kids, Bad Kids: A Revelation About the Due Process Rights 
of Children, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 407, 426 (1996) (explaining that the Supreme Court “extended 
power to the state under the parens patriae power to justify compulsory education, then found a 
coextensive parens patriae power to justify disciplining the children” (emphasis added)). 
76.  See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972). 
77.  Id. The concept probably arose earlier “in ancient civilizations such as Greece, Egypt, and 
Persia.” Thomas J. Cunningham, Considering Religion as a Factor in Foster Care in the Aftermath of 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith and the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 53, 96 (1994). 
78.  O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583 (1975). For a history of the doctrine’s 
application, see George B. Curtis, The Checkered Career of a Parens Patriae: The State as Parent or 
Tyrant?, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 895 (1976). 
79.  See Rebecca Williams, Note, Faith Healing Exceptions Versus Parens Patriae: Something’s 
Gotta Give, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 692, 722 (2012) (citing cases); see also Cty. of McLean v. 
Humphreys, 104 Ill. 378, 383 (1882) (“It is the unquestioned right and imperative duty of every 
enlightened government, in its character of parens patriæ, to protect and provide for the comfort and 
well-being of such of its citizens [who] are unable to take care of themselves.”). 
80.  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). 
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Hence, even if, as Bauries maintains, the majority of state courts have 
operationalized the right to education as a Hohfeldian power held by the 
legislature,81 that power is not unfettered and indeed must be attendant to 
the state’s duties. Whether any of these state duties correspond to 
Hohfeldian claim-rights—as suggested by the third path that some states 
have taken—is, again, an issue we will address in depth later. For now, it 
should be understood that the Hohfeldian power does not exhaust all forms 
of the right to education. 
2. A Qualified “Privilege” Held by Parents or Guardians 
The right to education does not take the form of a Hohfeldian privilege 
held by children. The law enables—indeed encourages—parents, 
guardians, and state actors to interfere directly in the public education of 
children. Moreover, compulsory education laws deprive children of the 
privilege not to receive an education. 
To be sure, parents retain the privilege under the U.S. Constitution to 
decide whether their children will receive a public or private education82 
and, in a more general sense, the privilege “to control the education of their 
own,”83 including directing the religious education of their children.84 
Notably, however, these privileges are not unrestrained85 and may be 
subject to the exercise of state powers that bear “reasonable” regulations.86 
Consequently, although these parental privileges have been described as 
fundamental,87 some courts have concluded otherwise because the language 
 
81.  See Dailey, supra note 69, at 2112–13 (explaining that “state parens patriae authority does 
not lead to children having rights of their own”). 
82.  See Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 
(1925). 
83.  Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401. 
84.  See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
85.  See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976) (“The Court has repeatedly stressed that 
while parents have a constitutional right to send their children to private schools and . . . to select 
private schools that offer specialized instruction, they have no constitutional right to provide their 
children with private school education unfettered by reasonable government regulation.”); Brown v. 
Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533–34 (1st Cir. 1995) (concluding parents’ liberty interest 
to choose their children’s education free of governmental interference did not include right to “dictate 
the curriculum” and thereby “restrict the flow of information”), abrogated by Cty. of Sacramento v. 
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998); Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1067–70 (6th Cir. 
1987) (denying parental challenges to textbook reading series). 
86.  See Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (“[W]e have recognized that a state is not 
without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or 
mental health is jeopardized.”); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213 (“There is no doubt as to the power of a State, 
having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the 
control and duration of basic education.”); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402 (“The power of the state to compel 
attendance at some school and to make reasonable regulations for all schools . . . is not questioned.”). 
87.  See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 680 n.5 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“This Court has held that parents have the fundamental liberty to choose how and in what manner to 
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of the Supreme Court’s opinions suggests that laws infringing on these 
privileges merit rational basis review, not strict scrutiny.88 And the Court 
has failed to specify the applicable standard. On the one hand, it has 
emphasized that the interest of parents “in the care, custody, and control of 
their children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests” 
it has recognized;89 on the other hand, it has employed a balancing test, 
weighing parental liberty interests against competing state interests.90 
Whether the parental privilege to “control the . . . education” of 
children is fundamental or not, it is by no means absolute.91 Furthermore, 
as Bauries points out, courts have typically construed state constitutional 
rights to education in resolving school finance litigation, and in that 
context, “it simply fits poorly” to speak of children possessing a privilege 
“to a certain amount of educational resources.”92 The focus in those cases is 
not on the child’s ability to act without interference but on whether the 
state’s appropriation of resources is adequate or equitable.93 The point 
being that courts have not confined the right to education’s form to a 
Hohfeldian privilege. And even when the right does take the form of a 
privilege, it is one essentially held by parents and guardians. Still, it is fair 
to say that we think of children themselves as holders of some form of the 
right to education. The next two sections explore that idea. 
3. An “Immunity” Held by Children Against the State 
The right to education has taken the form of an immunity held by 
children. Curiously, “immunities have not generally received as much 
attention” as other Hohfeldian incidents, even though “they are of huge 
 
educate their children.”); see also Jack MacMullan, Comment, The Constitutionality of State Home 
Schooling Statutes, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1309, 1320 n.64 (1994) (citing scholarship concluding that 
parental privileges regarding their children’s education are fundamental and should be subject to strict 
scrutiny). 
88.  See MacMullan, supra note 87, at 1320 & n.65 (collecting cases where courts “have balked 
at recognizing a fundamental parental right to direct their children’s education”); Timothy Brandon 
Waddell, Note, Bringing It All Back Home: Establishing a Coherent Constitutional Framework for the 
Re-Regulation of Homeschooling, 63 VAND. L. REV. 541, 569 (2010). 
89.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring) (observing 
that none of the six Justices who joined the opinion “articulate[] the appropriate standard of review” but 
asserting that strict scrutiny should apply “to infringements of fundamental rights”). 
90.  See Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 519–20 (7th Cir. 2003) (interpreting Troxel to require 
balancing of factors regarding parents’ fundamental right and state’s compelling interests); David D. 
Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After Troxel and Carhart, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1152–
53, 1163–64 (2001). 
91.  Care and Prot. of Charles, 504 N.E.2d 592, 598–99 (Mass. 1987) (concluding liberty interest 
of parents to educate their children “is not absolute but must be reconciled with the substantial State 
interest in the education of its citizenry”). 
92.  Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 328. 
93.  See id. 
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importance.”94 Significantly, many of the constitutional entitlements 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights can take the form of immunities.95 These 
immunities deprive Congress and, by incorporation, state legislatures of the 
power to enact certain kinds of laws, thereby imposing on legislative 
bodies correlative disabilities.96 
“For instance, one has an immunity right to freedom of expression, 
which bars the legislature from enacting legislation that extinguishes one’s 
[‘privilege’] to speak.”97 If the legislature enacts such a law, it will be 
deemed unconstitutional “because the legislature will have exceeded the 
limits of what it is constitutionally empowered to do.”98 
It is expedient that many of our most prominent constitutional rights 
include or take the form of immunities. A Hohfeldian immunity plays a 
critical “role in stabilizing other legal entitlements”—mainly by preventing 
others from divesting one of his claim-rights and privileges.99 And it is 
“because legal rights are almost always accompanied by immunities against 
most types of divestiture, [that such rights] provide solid legal protection 
against interference or uncooperativeness.”100 Hence, “we are likely to 
assert even trivial immunities as rights when we find others trying to make 
us do things that they are not empowered to require of us.”101 
So it should not diminish the right to education to note that it has taken 
the form of an immunity held by children. Indeed, Bauries avers that 
Brown v. Board of Education,102 the most renowned public education case, 
can be viewed as recognizing an immunity held by children against “state 
legislation requiring segregated schools.”103 For a time, Brown was 
 
94.  Kramer, supra note 21, at 416–17. 
95.  See id. at 417. Bauries goes so far as to assert that “the vast majority of the legal relationships 
set up in the U.S. Constitution between individuals and legislative bodies are relationships of powers, 
liabilities, immunities, and disabilities.” Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 312. I 
reserve judgment regarding the unassailability of that assertion. 
96.  Alon Harel, Theories of Rights, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
AND LEGAL THEORY 191, 193 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005). 
97.  Id.; see also WILLIAM A. EDMUNDSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO RIGHTS 91 (2004) (“To say 
that citizens enjoy a right of free speech is to say that they are immune from certain alterations of their 
legal duties, and this is in turn to say that the legislature is disabled from imposing certain legal 
duties.”); Waldron, supra note 60, at 27 (“To think that a constitutional immunity is called for is to 
think oneself justified in disabling legislators in this respect (and thus, indirectly, in disabling the 
citizens whom they represent).”). 
98.  PETER JONES, RIGHTS 24 (1994); see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, Incorporation of the 
Establishment Clause Against the States: A Logical, Textual, and Historical Account, 88 IND. L.J. 669, 
694–95 (2013) (“Constitutional disabilities on government action necessarily create correlative 
constitutional immunities from the consequences of actions that exceed the bounds of the disability.”). 
99.  Kramer, supra note 21, at 417. 
100.  Id.; see also REX MARTIN, A SYSTEM OF RIGHTS 31 (1993) (“[T]he most important means 
of institutionalizing some rights may be to create second-party disabilities . . . rather than duties.”). 
101.  JONES, supra note 98, at 25. 
102.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
103.  See Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 326. 
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perceived to confer more than an immunity against de jure segregation. 
Courts faithfully interpreted Brown’s assertion that “the opportunity of an 
education . . . is a right [that] must be made available to all on equal 
terms”104 to signify a fundamental right to education under the Equal 
Protection Clause.105 Rodriguez explicitly held otherwise; nevertheless, 
several state courts continued to adhere to Brown’s reasoning in 
interpreting their own constitutions, and as Bauries observes, many of these 
courts essentially took Hohfeldian “disability- and immunity-based 
approaches when presented with equality-based arguments” in school 
finance cases.106 
In several of these cases, the immunity held by children regarding the 
distribution of educational resources derives from recognition that the right 
to education is fundamental under the state constitution.107 In two of these 
states, California and Wyoming, the immunity against disparities in school 
funding also arises from the classification of wealth as a suspect class for 
equal protection purposes.108 
To be clear, none of the state courts that construe the right to education 
as fundamental characterize it explicitly as an immunity. But several of 
these courts have analyzed “whether legislative action was taken in excess 
 
104.  347 U.S. at 493. 
105.  See Enrich, supra note 13, at 117 n.77 (“Over and over again, the initial education financing 
cases in the early 1970’s relied on Brown for the conclusion that education was a fundamental right, 
deserving of intensive equal protection scrutiny.” (citing Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 
337 F. Supp. 280, 282 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev’d, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 
P.2d 1241, 1258 (Cal. 1971) (en banc); Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457, 469–70 (Mich. 1972), 
vacated, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187, 214 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 1972))). 
106.  Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 330. 
107.  The highest courts of fifteen states have previously recognized the right to education as a 
fundamental constitutional right in resolving school finance litigation. See Opinion of the Justices, 624 
So. 2d 107, 159 (Ala. 1993); Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590, 592 (Ariz. 1973) (but see Roosevelt 
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 811 (Ariz. 1994) (declining to decide whether 
education is fundamental right under state’s constitution)); Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1258; Horton v. 
Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 201 
(Ky. 1989); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor 
(Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353, 1358–59 (N.H. 1997); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (N.C. 
1997); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 259 (N.D. 1994); Tenn. Small Sch. 
Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 151 (Tenn. 1993); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 
(Va. 1994); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 104 (Wash. 1978) (en banc); Pauley v. Kelly, 
255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 579 (Wis. 1989); Washakie 
Cty. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 332–33 (Wyo. 1980). 
In a different context—a due process challenge to student discipline—the Supreme Court of Mississippi 
recognized a statutorily created fundamental right to a “minimally adequate public education.” See 
Clinton Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Byrd, 477 So. 2d 237, 240 (Miss. 1985). The court has not yet 
revisited that declaration since the education clause of the Mississippi constitution was amended in 
1987 to provide “for the establishment, maintenance and support of free public schools upon such 
conditions and limitations as the Legislature may prescribe.” MISS. CONST. art. 8, § 201. 
108.  See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976); Herschler, 606 P.2d at 
334. 
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of the limitations placed on it by the state constitutions.”109 That is, their 
focus has been on whether the legislature had contravened the 
constitutionally imposed Hohfeldian disabilities correlative to “immunities 
against unequal treatment.”110 Courts in seven states recognizing a 
fundamental right to education have indeed subjected their school financing 
schemes to equal protection analysis.111 Five of those courts applied strict 
scrutiny, as would be expected for a fundamental right;112 one court 
diverged on its own, applying an intermediate level of scrutiny;113 and yet 
another court required only rational basis review to find its school 
financing scheme unconstitutional.114 
It is worth pausing here to point out that equal protection need not take 
the exclusive form of an immunity, though that seems to be Bauries’s own 
view.115 In certain contexts, equal protection reasonably can be regarded in 
the form of a claim-right correlative to a duty on the state116—an 
entitlement that cannot be divested, without satisfying judicial scrutiny, 
because it is embedded with an immunity.117 Moreover, although Bauries 
 
109.  Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 332. 
110.  Id. 
111.  See Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d at 159 (but see Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813 (Ala. 
2002) (dismissing school finance litigation as nonjusticiable)); Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 951; Horton, 376 
A.2d at 373; Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 511 N.W.2d at 257; McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 156; 
Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 878; Herschler, 606 P.2d at 335. 
112.  See Opinion of the Justices, 624 So.2d at 159; Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 951; Horton, 376 
A.2d at 373; Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 878; Herschler, 606 P.2d at 335. 
113.  See Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 511 N.W.2d at 257. 
114.  See McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 156. 
115.  See Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 318 (“[W]here it exists against a 
legislative body of the state or federal government, what we call a ‘right to equal protection’ is actually 
an immunity against statutes that create invidious classifications, and where this immunity has been 
ignored or transgressed for decades, the vestigial harms thereby created sometimes necessitate 
affirmative remedial actions.”). 
116.  See O’Rourke, supra note 21, at 160 (contending that the language of the Equal Protection 
Clause “creates a primary rule giving each state a duty not to deny a person ‘the equal protection of the 
laws,’ which correlates with a claim for ‘any person within its jurisdiction’” (quoting U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1)); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 333 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he Equal Protection Clause implements a duty to govern impartially that requires, at the very least, 
that every decision by the sovereign serve some nonpartisan public purpose.”); ROBIN WEST, 
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 1–4 (1994) 
(arguing that equal protection imposes affirmative duties of protection); Black, supra note 11, at 321–
30 (contending that Fourteenth Amendment imposes affirmative duty on Congress to further and act 
consistently with, not merely enforce, equal protection); Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of 
the (Equal) Protection Clause: Subsequent Interpretation and Application, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 
219, 220 (2009) (defending “duty-to-protect reading” of equal protection); Pamela S. Karlan, Note, 
Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE L.J. 111, 
123–24 (1983) (“[T]he [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause imposes a duty of ‘virtual representation’ upon the 
legislature, an obligation that it consider the interests of all those whom its actions will affect.”). 
117.  See Kramer, supra note 21, at 416–17; Jeremy Waldron, Introduction to THEORIES OF 
RIGHTS 1, 7 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984) (“Constitutionally guaranteed privileges and claim-rights often 
also involve an immunity . . . .”); see also Susan Poser, Termination of Desegregation Decrees and the 
Elusive Meaning of Unitary Status, 81 NEB. L. REV. 283, 329 (2002) (analyzing equal protection in the 
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implies that the right to education has taken the form of an immunity 
against unequal or inequitable distributions, a few courts have 
comprehended an immunity against inadequate educational resources as 
well. Courts in four states that regard the right to education as fundamental 
have suggested that their legislatures were disabled from enacting a school 
financing scheme that produced certain educational inadequacies.118 
The right to education also need not be exalted to fundamental right 
status to confer an immunity. The highest courts in five states have 
effectuated an immunity without declaring the right fundamental or 
recognizing wealth as a suspect class. Those courts have held instead that 
the school finance schemes approved by the legislatures directly violated 
their state constitutions’ education clauses.119 Again, these decisions 
indicate that the right to education can take the form of an immunity 
against inequitable120 or inadequate121 distributions, or against both 
 
context of desegregation jurisprudence and suggesting that, in Hohfeldian terms, it takes the form of 
both “an immunity from being forced into segregated schools” and a “duty to assign all children to 
school on a non-discriminatory basis”). 
118.  See Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 815 (Ariz. 1973) 
(“[T]he system the legislature chooses to fund the public schools must not itself be the cause of 
substantial disparities. . . . [If reliance on property taxes and school districts] produce a public school 
system that cannot be said to be general and uniform throughout the state, then the laws chosen by the 
legislature to implement its constitutional obligation . . . fail in their purpose.”); Skeen v. State, 505 
N.W.2d 299, 315 (Minn. 1993) (“[T]his court will not strike down the legislature’s financing of such a 
system unless the resulting disparities dilute the adequacy of the constitutional entitlement to a ‘general 
and uniform system’ of education.”); Claremont II, 703 A.2d 1353, 1360 (N.H. 1997) (“Imposing 
dissimilar and unreasonable tax burdens on the school districts creates serious impediments to the 
State’s constitutional charge to provide an adequate education for its public school students.”); Kukor v. 
Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 582 (Wis. 1989) (“While our deference would abruptly cease should the 
legislature determine that it was ‘impracticable’ to provide to each student a right to attend a public 
school at which a basic education could be obtained, or if funds were discriminatorily disbursed and 
there existed no rational basis for such finance system, we will otherwise defer to the legislature’s 
determination of the degree to which fiscal policy can be applied to achieve uniformity.”). 
119.  See DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 92–95 (Ark. 1983); Gannon v. State, 
319 P.3d 1196, 1239–47 (Kan. 2014); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 689–
91 (Mont. 1989); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 747 (Ohio 1997); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 
397 (Vt. 1997). 
120.  See DuPree, 651 S.W.2d at 95 (affirming lower court’s ruling that financing scheme 
violated “state constitutional provisions guaranteeing equal protection of the laws [by denying] equal 
educational opportunity” (quoting Serrano II, 557 P.2d 929, 946 (Cal. 1976))); Helena, 769 P.2d at 690 
(affirming lower court’s ruling that “spending disparities among the State’s school districts translate 
into a denial of equality of educational opportunity”); Brigham, 692 A.2d at 397 (“[W]e hold that the 
student and school district plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law that the current 
educational financing system in Vermont violates the right to equal educational opportunities 
under . . . the Vermont Constitution.”). 
121.  See DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 741 (agreeing with prior precedent that legislature’s discretion 
was “not without limits” and that a financing scheme would be unconstitutionally inadequate “if a 
school district was receiving so little local and state revenue that the students were effectively being 
deprived of educational opportunity” (internal quotation marks omitted)) 
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inequitable and inadequate distributions.122 
Altogether, then, courts in at least sixteen states have at times 
articulated the right to education in the form of an immunity, though the 
content and relative strength of that immunity vary. As we shall see, a few 
of these same courts and several others have espoused the right to 
education as a claim-right as well—the third path that courts have tread in 
resolving school finance litigation. 
4. A “Claim-Right” Held by Children Correlative with State Duties 
The right to education has taken the form of a claim-right held by 
children. First and foremost, “most state constitutions [furnish] a strong 
textual basis for an explicit Hohfeldian duty to provide for education.”123 
For instance, most of the education clause provisions employ “duty-based 
terms such as ‘shall’ to impose obligations” on the state.124 Some express 
the duty generally to “establish and maintain” public schools, others direct 
the duty “to hortatory purposes, such as to ‘encourage’ education,” and still 
others “specify detailed requirements for the provision of educational 
services.”125 
Notwithstanding the strong textual support, Bauries concludes that the 
majority of state courts have not conceptualized “the education clauses in 
their state constitutions as sources of Hohfeldian claim-rights correlative to 
legislative duties.”126 By his count, courts in six states have construed their 
states’ constitutions as sources of a Hohfeldian claim-right to education.127 
According to Bauries, only these six state courts “articulated both the duty 
and the individual right” and entered or approved entry of a remedial order 
“compelling the performance of the legislative duty on behalf of the 
plaintiffs.”128 
The last point is key for Bauries because “claim-rights call for 
enforcement.”129 On his view, to enforce a claim-right correlative to a 
“positive” duty, like the duty to provide education, a court “must compel 
 
122.  See Gannon, 319 P.3d at 1233, 1238–47 (remanding to lower court for determination of 
whether school financing scheme satisfied “adequacy test” but upholding lower court’s decision that 
scheme failed the “equity test” by creating “unconstitutional, wealth-based disparities”). 
123.  Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 325. 
124.  Id. at 323. 
125.  Id. at 323, 324. 
126.  Id. at 340. 
127.  See id. at 333–40 (discussing the decisions of state courts in Arkansas, New Jersey, New 
York, North Carolina, Washington, and Wyoming). 
128.  Id. at 340 (emphasis added). 
129.  Id. at 352. 
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action (as it does in a specific performance contractual case).”130 So even 
though Bauries notes that eight other state courts have articulated “duty-
based conceptions” of the right to education, those courts did not compel 
their legislatures to undertake specific remediation, citing “separation of 
powers concerns.”131 Thus, according to Bauries, the plaintiffs in those 
cases apparently did not possess a claim-right because they could not 
“judicially compel the duty’s performance.”132 
To be sure, a right must be enforceable to take the form of a genuine 
claim-right.133 But it does not follow that a right to education exists as a 
claim-right only if it has been judicially enforced by an injunctive remedy. 
Here we must consider the elusive relationship between legal rights and 
remedies. For Hohfeld, “the question of the existence of a right is distinct 
from the question of the availability of a remedy for the violation of that 
right.”134 That is, he considered a right logically prior to its remedy, 
tracking the noted distinction between a “primary right” and a “secondary 
right” (also referred to simply as the “remedy” or, as used here for 
consistency, a “remedial right”).135 
 
130.  Id. at 353 (“Ostensibly, if an individual has a claim-right to educational services, then he 
should be able to compel the provision of such services to him.”); see also id. at 317 (“[A] positive 
right, in Hohfeldian terms, can only take the form of a claim-right to compel the government to act in a 
certain way toward the holder of the right.”). 
131.  Id. at 343–46 (discussing state court decisions in Kentucky, Ohio, South Carolina, New 
Hampshire, Vermont, Montana, Idaho, and Arizona). 
132.  Id. at 343. 
133.  See Kramer, supra note 22, at 9, 64 (“[Claim-rights] must be enforceable if they are to 
qualify as genuine claims . . . .”). Apart from legal rights, philosophers debate whether moral rights can 
exist independent of enforcement mechanisms. Compare RAYMOND GEUSS, HISTORY AND ILLUSION IN 
POLITICS 146 (2001) (asserting that rights exists only when they are “backed up by an effective method 
of implementation”), and Susan James, Rights as Enforceable Claims, 103 PROCEEDINGS 
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 133, 136–37 (2003) (agreeing with Geuss and proposing three conditions of 
enforceability), with Cruft, supra note 53, at 393 (contending that a moral right “can exist whether or 
not institutions exist to enforce it”), and Katherine Eddy, Against Ideal Rights, 34 SOC. THEORY & 
PRAC. 463, 466 (2008) (rejecting James’s enforcement view of moral rights). 
134.  RATNAPALA, supra note 60, at 350; see also Hanoch Dagan, Remedies, Rights, and 
Properties, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 3 (2011) (“Hohfeld claims that rights should be carefully distinguished from, 
and not only be thought as dependent on, both the character of the proceedings by which [they] may be 
vindicated and the remedies arising from their violation.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). This is not to say that Hohfeld was necessarily committed to the proposition that a 
right can exist without any remedy. In truth, “there is nothing in his writing that commits him either 
way.” EDMUNDSON, supra note 97, at 99; see also John Finnis, Some Professorial Fallacies About 
Rights, 4 ADELAIDE L. REV. 377, 380 (1972) (“The relevance of ‘legal remedies’ to the defining terms 
of his schema is left entirely undetermined by Hohfeld.” (emphasis omitted)). 
135.  See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 122–34 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
1994). The primary–secondary rights distinction preceded Hart and Sacks’s exposition. See, e.g., 1 
JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 44–45 (Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1885); 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 117–21 (1979); JOHN NORTON POMEROY, 
REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS §§ 1–3 (1876). “Hohfeld too emphasized the distinction in his 
classification” before Hart and Sacks. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of 
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Primary rights are created by voluntary agreement or by operation of 
law.136 For instance, a primary right to education might exist by operation 
of the education clause in the state constitution, and it would exist 
independently, meaning its existence would not depend “on the breach of a 
preexisting right or duty.”137 By contrast, remedial rights—including the 
power to initiate legal proceedings to demand damages or performance—
exist solely to provide a legal process and consequence for infringements of 
the primary right.138 Thus, primary rights have been regarded as the “pure 
values” of the law, whereas “remedial rights are those tangential, practical 
questions of how to implement those core values.”139 Daryl Levinson dubs 
this approach, to constitutional law in particular, “rights essentialism.”140 
Rights essentialism assumes a process of constitutional 
adjudication that begins with judicial identification of a pure 
constitutional value. The pure value is then corrupted by being 
forced into a remedial apparatus that translates the right into an 
operational rule applied to the facts of the real world.141 
That “rights exist in a separate realm from—and can be defined 
without reference to—remedies” pervades “the conventional understanding 
of constitutional law,”142 counting among its adherents eminent legal 
 
Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 607 (2008) (citing 
HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS, supra note 18, at 108–09). 
136.  Balganesh, supra note 135, at 605. 
137.  Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “Hot News”: The Enduring Myth of Property in News, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 419, 481 (2011) (citing HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS, supra note 
18, at 101–02); see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983 and the 
APA, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 233, 249 (1991) (“Primary law concerns the authoritative directive 
arrangements—or more simply, the legal rules—that govern persons independently of litigation.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
138.  See HART & SACKS, supra note 135, at 122. A remedial right can take the form of a “right 
of action,” which is the “capacity to invoke the judgment of a tribunal of authoritative application upon 
a disputed question about the application of preexisting arrangements and to secure, if the claim proves 
to be well-founded, an appropriate official remedy.” Id. at 137; see also Benjamin C. Zipursky, 
Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
623, 632–33 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) (suggesting that the remedial right of action 
takes the form of a Hohfeldian “legal power (albeit conditioned and mediated)” because if the plaintiff 
is successful, she “will alter the legal relation between herself and the defendant”). 
139.  Tracy A. Thomas, Congress’ Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
673, 683 (2001) (citing Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of 
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 46, 54–55 (1979); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status 
of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978)). 
140.  See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
857 (1999). 
141.  Id. at 858 (footnote omitted). 
142.  Id. at 858, 914. “Rights occupy an exalted sphere of principle, while remedies are consigned 
to the banausic sphere of policy, pragmatism, and politics.” Id. at 857. 
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theorists143 and Supreme Court Justices.144 Nevertheless, Levinson rejects 
rights essentialism in favor of “remedial equilibration,” a view that 
acknowledges the interdependence of rights and remedies: “Rights are 
dependent on remedies not just for their application to the real world, but 
for their scope, shape, and very existence.”145 This notion, that rights and 
remedies are so “inextricably intertwined,”146 accords with the thinking of 
early legal realists, law and economics scholars, and leading pragmatists.147 
i. The Claim-Right to Education—Emblematic of Rights 
Essentialism or Remedial Equilibration? 
Levinson proposes three observable means by which remedies alter 
rights,148 one of which is most pertinent to school finance litigation—
remedial deterrence. Its “defining feature is the threat of undesirable 
remedial consequences motivating courts to construct the right in such a 
way as to avoid those consequences.”149 For example, Levinson suggests 
that courts constricted the scope of Brown’s equal protection right to a 
prohibition on de jure segregation because a de facto interpretation would 
 
143.  See id. at 867–72 & nn.49, 58 & 64 (identifying Ronald Dworkin, Richard Fallon, Owen 
Fiss, Henry Monaghan, Lawrence Sager, Frederick Schauer, and Peter Schuck as rights essentialists). 
“Scholars who work in this tradition see their mission as elucidating the essential characteristics of legal 
entitlements, offering typologies of entitlements, and positioning entitlements within the greater 
framework of legal concepts.” Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Relational Contingency of 
Rights, 98 VA. L. REV. 1313, 1335 (2012). 
144.  See, e.g., City of Sherrill v. Onedia Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 213 (2005) (Ginsburg, J.) 
(“The substantive questions whether the plaintiff has any right or the defendant has any duty, and if so 
what it is, are very different questions from the remedial questions whether this remedy or that is 
preferred, and what the measure of the remedy is.” (quoting D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
REMEDIES § 1.2, at 3 (1973))); Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 65–66 (1992) (“As we 
have often stated, the question of what remedies are available under a statute that provides a private 
right of action is ‘analytically distinct’ from the issue of whether such a right exists in the first place.” 
(quoting Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979))). 
145.  Levinson, supra note 140, at 858. 
146.  Id. 
147.  See, e.g., K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 94 (1960) 
(“[A] right is best measured by effects in life. Absence of remedy is absence of right.”); Guido 
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Guido Calabresi, Remarks: The Simple Virtues of The 
Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2201, 2205 (1997) (“Of course, the so-called remedy defines the nature of the 
right . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., The Path of 
the Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 992 (1997) (“[A] legal duty so called is nothing but 
a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that way by 
judgment of the court; — and so of a legal right.”); Levinson, supra note 140, at 927–31 & n.315 
(contending that “remedial equilibration has deep affinities” with the “anti-rights-essentialist thrust” of 
Richard Posner’s and Cass Sunstein’s scholarship and that David Strauss and Posner can, despite their 
differences, “comfortably coexist under the big tent of remedial equilibration”). 
148.  See Levinson, supra note 140, at 885–88, 889–911 (defining “remedial deterrence,” 
“incorporation,” and “substantiation” and providing case illustrations of each form of equilibration at 
work). 
149.  Id. at 885. 
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have entailed indefinite federal court supervision of school districts and 
measures such as busing to achieve and sustain racial balance.150 
Remedial deterrence reinforces Bauries’s conclusion that the right to 
education has not been conceptualized as a claim-right in cases where 
courts have articulated a claim-right–duty correlation but have nevertheless 
failed to enter an injunction compelling specific performance. Those courts 
have been disinclined to enjoin their legislatures to perform—i.e., in most 
cases, to increase school funding—because such orders might encroach on 
legislative prerogatives over the state budget and thus potentially violate 
the separation of powers.151 As a result, Bauries contends that those courts 
have curtailed the constitutional duty to a simple “duty to legislate” and 
have paired that duty with legislative Hohfeldian powers to decide how to 
establish and maintain the education system, “at what level to fund it,” and 
sometimes even “the discretion to determine what the education clause 
itself means.”152 In so doing, Bauries thinks those courts have, despite their 
rhetoric, altered the form of the right to education from a claim-right to a 
modest immunity correlative to few legislative disabilities, preventing 
“only legislative action that is arbitrary” in providing an adequate 
education.153 
From the remedial equilibration viewpoint, that analysis may be sound. 
Yet rights essentialists could perceive those same decisions as illustrating 
the expected “gaps” between rights and remedies.154 They could even 
commend the courts for preserving the constitutional value at stake by 
articulating the right to education as a claim-right correlative to a 
legislative duty notwithstanding the reluctance to enforce that primary right 
through a remedial right of specific performance. 
It is unclear whether Bauries fully assents to either perspective. 
Although he acknowledges the “force” of arguments favoring equilibration, 
he “adheres to the view that, at some level, rights and remedies can and 
 
150.  See id. at 884; see also Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 602 
(1983) (analyzing school desegregation decisions and asserting that remedial “costs obviously play a 
role in defining the content of the right itself”). 
151.  See Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 353–54. 
152.  Id. at 349, 350, 351. 
153.  Id. at 364; see id. at 361. Such a description of the legislative disability, according to 
Bauries, “fits the conception that the overwhelming majority of state courts have actually applied.” Id. 
at 364. 
154.  See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 
87, 91–95 (1999) (“The distance between the ideal and the real means that there will always be some 
shortfall between the aspirations we call rights and the mechanisms we call remedies.”); see also 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 1275, 1317 (2006) (“[A] gap frequently exists between constitutional meaning and judicially 
enforced doctrine . . . .”). 
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should be thought of distinctly.”155 Bauries would not be the first to attempt 
to straddle both rights essentialism and remedial equilibration.156 Even 
Hohfeld, who advanced the right–remedy dichotomy, has been accused of 
distorting it.157 
To Bauries’s credit, both accounts acknowledge that rights and 
remedies can be distinguished, at least conceptually. The rights essentialist 
finds value in legal discourse that venerates that conceptual distinction, 
even when remedies influence the way rights are adjudicated and 
enforced;158 the pragmatist finds value in discourse that is more forthright 
in expressing “the permeability of the conceptual membrane separating 
rights from remedies.”159 Perhaps, as some have suggested, these positions 
are not that far apart and could be reconciled in some manner.160 That 
 
155.  See Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 318 n.73. For Bauries, the 
“distinction is that the primary right is present and the remedial right is inchoate and conditional.” Id. 
(noting that “especially in public law litigation[, the remedial right] is subject to significant ad hoc 
judicial discretion—which includes the discretion not to order a remedy at all”). 
156.  See Bauries, Education Duty, supra note 15, at 733 (implying that when the remedial right 
cannot be perfected the primary right is “devalued at best and eliminated at worst”). But see id. at 733 
n.147 (suggesting that such a “conclusion is a natural extension of the well-known theory of ‘remedial 
equilibration’”). 
157.  See David A. Case, Article I Courts, Substantive Rights, and Remedies for Government 
Misconduct, 26 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 101, 198 n.502 (2005) (noting that Hart and Sacks claimed that 
Hohfeld “blurred” the distinction between primary and secondary rights “by essentially arguing that it is 
obvious that if there is no remedy, there is no right, but conced[ing] that in some circumstances the 
secondary right may be in addition to an obligation to perform a court-ordered performance of a 
primary duty”). But see GERALD J. POSTEMA, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE 
COMMON LAW WORLD 102 (2011) (“Hohfeld’s analysis is not committed to the familiar doctrine that 
there is no right without a remedy, but it can explain the doctrine.”). 
158.  Cf. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 13 (2004) 
(suggesting that “judges, scholars, and litigators should make greater efforts to distinguish whether a 
constitutional rule is an announcement of constitutional meaning (i.e., a constitutional operative 
proposition) or, instead, is a constitutional decision rule,” which might be supplemented by remedial 
rules, because it will “improve the project of constitutional adjudication” to make that distinction). 
159.  Levinson, supra note 140, at 939; see Gewirtz, supra note 150, at 678–79 (“There is a 
permeable wall between rights and remedies: The prospect of actualizing rights through a remedy—the 
recognition that rights are for actual people in an actual world—makes it inevitable that thoughts of 
remedy will affect thoughts of right, that judges’ minds will shuttle back and forth between right and 
remedy.”). 
160.  See Berman, supra note 158, at 50–51 (proposing the possibility of drawing “coherent 
dividing lines within the sprawling sphere of constitutional doctrine . . . in a way that does not depend 
upon the anti-Pragmatist assumption that a meaningful sort of constitutional interpretation exists which 
does not involve ‘practical’ or ‘instrumental’ considerations” (footnote omitted)); Fallon, supra note 
154, at 1314 (disagreeing with remedial equilibration but noting that “many of [his own] claims” about 
constitutional adjudication and the gaps between constitutional norms and their implementation “would 
fit comfortably within a pragmatist framework”); Jennifer E. Laurin, Rights Translation and Remedial 
Disequilibration in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1013–14 (2010) 
(attempting to bring the “pragmatist” (remedial equilibration) and “decision rules model[s]” (rights 
essentialism) together by elucidating the process of “rights translation,” which “prioritizes stability in 
constitutional meaning and attention to the relationship between constitutional principles and the tests 
that implement them” but “demands that courts assess the possibility that remedial imperatives require 
doctrinal refinement”); Kermit Roosevelt III, Aspiration and Underenforcement, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 
193, 194–95 (2005) (agreeing with Levinson that “remedial considerations exert an important influence 
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project is, of course, well beyond the purview of this Article. Yet we need 
not resolve the larger debate to find an acceptable path forward. 
ii. Nominal Claim-Rights 
When the primary right has been deemed judicially unenforceable, and 
thus the remedial right is unobtainable, the primary right is “inoperative” 
and “purely nominal.”161 Bauries questions whether, in such circumstances, 
it makes sense to call a constitutional provision a “right.”162 That sentiment 
is shared by supporters of the “will theory” of rights, as explained in the 
next section.163 But, assuming the ontological existence of nominal rights, 
there is no logical reason that such rights cannot take the form of 
Hohfeldian claim-rights correlative to nominal duties.164 
“Nominal” might be somewhat of a misnomer because such claim-
rights still impose legal norms that can “channel and direct people’s 
conduct[—e.g., elicit compliance—]in ways that are not attainable by 
nonexistent legal norms.”165 People can and do resolve to discharge their 
nominal duties in recognition of the important interests they serve, perform 
 
over the shape of” decision rules “that courts apply to determine whether rights have been violated” and 
that such “interrelation of remedies and decision rules is . . . entirely consistent with the decision rules 
model”). 
161.  See Matthew H. Kramer, On the Nature of Legal Rights, 59 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 473, 482–83 
(2000) (explaining that, without a remedy, a “legal duty is purely nominal . . . because no one has any 
legal power to take or induce” measures to enforce the duty); cf. Levinson, supra note 140, at 934 
(observing that when the Supreme Court “put an end to effective school desegregation by cutting off 
remedies . . . the nominal right [to integration remained] intact” (emphasis added)). 
162.  See Bauries, Education Duty, supra note 15, at 763. 
163.  See Kramer, supra note 161, at 486 (“[T]he [w]ill [t]heory obliges its proponents to deny 
the existence of any unenforceable legal rights.”). It is also a sentiment reflected in the jurisprudential 
tradition that “where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever 
that right is invaded.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1309, 1310 & n.6 (2003) (observing that the right to a remedy “expressly or implicitly appears in forty 
state constitutions”); Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement 
of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665 (1987). As it has been repeatedly observed, 
however, “the Marbury dictum simply does not describe reality.” Trevor W. Morrison, Suspension and 
the Extrajudicial Constitution, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1533, 1586 (2007). 
164.  See Kramer, supra note 22, at 34 (“Though an absence of enforcement deprives [claim-] 
rights of their genuineness, it has exactly the same effect on the rights’ correlative obligations. Hence, 
an unenforced statute maintains a strict correlativity of duties and rights; just as genuine duties must 
correlate with genuine rights, nominal duties must correlate with nominal rights.”); see also HART & 
SACKS, supra note 135, at 137 (“Such a right, in strictness, is a valid claim to the personal benefit of the 
performance of a legal duty, not deriving from any default (through breach of duty or defective exercise 
of power) occurring in any precedent legal position. . . . The breach of a primary private duty may or 
may not give rise, by operation of law, to a remedial private duty.”). 
165.  Kramer, supra note 161, at 493. Such norms establish more than voluntary guidelines 
because they are presented “as mandates which disallow routes that are incompatible with what the 
norms require.” Id. at 495; see also TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 57–68 (1990) 
(drawing on sociological research to suggest that individual compliance with criminal norms depends 
less on the sanctions attached to those norms and more on perceptions of a legal system’s legitimacy). 
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them “simply out of habit,” or fulfill their duties to avoid “punishment[—] 
even if this is only social or moral criticism or regret.”166 
Legislators are not impervious to such pressures and “might feel a 
moral obligation, enforced through politics, to do what the constitution 
says.”167 Indeed, just because nominal claim-rights are judicially 
unenforceable “does not mean that they are not enforceable at all. 
Judicially unenforceable rights can have real world consequences if 
enforced by the political branches.”168 After all, “[m]any constitutional 
provisions[, including many education clauses in state constitutions,] speak 
in the first instance to officials other than judges.”169 
Short of formal litigation, the holder of a nominal claim-right can also 
“demand the recognition and performance of the duty in numerous extra-
judicial ways: in personal contact, in out of court settlements, in 
arbitration[,] or before officials other than judges.”170 Within the confines 
of a civil or criminal proceeding, the holder might raise a nominal claim-
right or duty as a shield in her defense.171 Courts can also justify their 
refusal to recognize other rights that conflict with nominal claim-rights and 
duties.172 And, as Helen Hershkoff has explained, even when the judiciary 
declines to enforce certain constitutional rights directly, an “indirect 
 
166.  MARK R. REIFF, PUNISHMENT, COMPENSATION, AND LAW: A THEORY OF ENFORCEABILITY 
236–39 (2005) (explaining the previolation value of nominal rights). 
167.  Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
1895, 1901 (2004) (maintaining that nonjusticiable rights may have political salience in societies with 
“entrenched democratic cultures—where civil society stands ready to inflict political damage to 
legislators who depart from the constitution’s requirements—and advanced welfare states”); see also 
Frank I. Michelman, What (If Anything) Is Progressive-Liberal Democratic Constitutionalism?, 4 
WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 181, 199 (1999) (asserting that in “some political cultures” constitutional rights 
that “impose on non-judicial political actors” judicially unenforceable rights need not be “an empty 
gesture,” although acknowledging that American political culture may not be such a culture). 
168.  Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 441, 453 (2004). 
169.  Fallon, supra note 154, at 1315; see also EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE 
WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS, 92–94 (2013) 
(observing that education activists and political actors encouraged the drafting of detailed, mandatory 
education clauses in state constitutions to make it “harder for legislatures to ignore” and to “insulate 
educational policies from potentially hostile judiciaries”). 
170.  PAVLOS ELEFTHERIADIS, LEGAL RIGHTS 117 (2008); see Philip Harvey, Aspirational Law, 
52 BUFF. L. REV. 701, 714 (2004) (“The most interesting and historically important examples of the 
vindication of human rights claims have always involved situations in which popular movements used 
extra-judicial means to enforce what they perceived to be a higher species of law.”). 
171.  See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1387, 1392 (2007) (“One way or another, persons who are targets of government coercion must be 
given an opportunity to defend by showing that this action is taken in violation of the Constitution.”); 
see also Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs 
and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 327 (1988) (“Offensive 
remedies will often be preferable, [however], because the very freedom that defensive remedies give 
officials in choosing how to respond is not always desirable.”). 
172.  Tushnet, supra note 167, at 1898. 
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constitutional effect” can be achieved when courts import a nominal right’s 
implicit norms into common law doctrine.173 
If a primary right can take the form of a claim-right when there is no 
remedial right, then it must also be the case that a primary right can take 
the form of a claim-right when there is a remedial right to some relief other 
than an injunctive remedy. The type of relief available may well affect the 
primary right’s content or scope,174 but it need not change its Hohfeldian 
form.175 So long as the constitutional provision establishes a claim-right–
duty correlation, the right can retain the form of a genuine (as opposed to a 
nominal) claim-right, provided it is judicially enforceable.176 
“Enforcement,” however, “is not a single event but is a process with 
stages.”177 
iii. Enforcement of the Claim-Right to Education 
The early stages of judicial enforcement involve the claim-right holder 
exercising his power to seek redress in court. The possession of a 
cognizable cause of action that invokes the coercive power of the state can 
itself be a substantial means of enforcement.178 “In some states, the mere 
 
173.  Helen Hershkoff, “Just Words”: Common Law and the Enforcement of State Constitutional 
Social and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1556–70 (2010). 
174.  See Bauries, Common Law Constitutionalism, supra note 15, at 969 (suggesting that Court’s 
adoption of rational basis review in Rodriguez demonstrates “how the content of a right becomes bound 
up with concerns over its remediation” (emphasis added)); Dagan, supra note 134, at 6–7 (concluding 
“that while remedies indeed exist for a purpose that is captured in the language of rights, the scope and 
content of rights (and thus the availability of various types of remedies) are, or at least can and should 
be, carefully circumscribed according to their underlying rationales”); Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 
B.U. L. REV. 405, 416 (2012) (crediting Kermit Roosevelt’s work for explaining that “the decision rules 
and pragmatist positions share an important characteristic: the available remedy influences the content 
of the right that courts articulate in a given case”). 
175.  This view likely comports with the Hohfeldian scheme. See Balganesh, supra note 135, at 
630 n.125 (suggesting that Hohfeld probably did not think of rights as completely independent of 
remedies; rather his “analysis seems to be restricted to arguing that the nature and character of the 
primary right were to be understood independent of the nature and character of the secondary right that 
comes into play to enforce the former”); see also ELEFTHERIADIS, supra note 170, at 112–13 
(concluding that Hohfeld’s scheme lies “somewhere between the dominant traditions of jurisprudence 
at the dawn of the twentieth century, pragmatism and idealism”). 
176.  See ELEFTHERIADIS, supra note 170, at 117 (explaining that a claim-right “can lead to a 
number of different remedies: specific performance or claim for damages, or a combination of the 
two”); cf. Bauries, Common Law Constitutionalism, supra note 15, at 1005 (suggesting violation of 
claim-right to education could lead to several types of individualized remedies, including tuition 
waivers, tutoring, after-school programs, changes in classroom settings, and vouchers). 
177.  Kramer, supra note 22, at 62; see also REIFF, supra note 166, at 45–75 (describing three 
critical stages of enforcement—the previolation stage, the postviolation stage, and the postenforcement 
stage). 
178.  See Kramer, supra note 22, at 62–63; see also supra note 134 and sources cited therein; cf. 
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 240 n.18 (1979) (“A plaintiff may have a cause of action even though 
he be entitled to no relief at all, as, for example, when a plaintiff sues for declaratory or injunctive relief 
although his case does not fulfill the ‘preconditions’ for such equitable remedies.”). 
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filing of a complaint has led to significant [school finance] reforms.”179 
Beyond the initiation of a civil action, the “claim-holder may miss a 
deadline or go to the wrong court, or provide insufficient evidence and 
therefore fail to win the remedy.”180 But we would not say that the 
rightholder’s failure to secure a remedy in these circumstances means that 
the right he sought to enforce was not a claim-right.181 Moreover, even 
when, for instance, plaintiffs in school finance cases have been 
unsuccessful, the litigation itself has at times placed “the issue of finance 
reform at the top of the legislative agenda, in some cases prompting 
significant legislative changes.”182 
In later stages of judicial enforcement, courts have used “a variety of 
techniques to enforce state constitutional socio-economic rights,” like the 
right to education.183 Many have coupled “declaratory relief with on[]going 
supervisory jurisdiction” in order “to ‘cue’ the political branches as to their 
constitutional duties and then allow those actors time and a zone of 
permissible discretion within which to meet their constitutional 
responsibilities.”184 Several legal scholars favor such enforcement to the 
extent it facilitates an ongoing dialogue between the judiciary and 
legislature185—sometimes referred to as the “experimentalist approach” to 
underscore that the resultant remedies are “provisional and subject to 
continuous revision.”186 
Declaratory relief and supervisory jurisdiction, so-called “weak 
remedies,”187 cannot be categorically rejected as insufficient to enforce 
claim-rights. Experience shows that parties routinely obey declaratory 
 
179.  Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary 
Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1527 (2007). 
180.  ELEFTHERIADIS, supra note 170, at 118. 
181.  See id. at 118 (“Claims are therefore both distinct from and prior to remedies. Remedies are 
only one stage in the fate of the duty.”). 
182.  Rebell, supra note 179, at 1528. 
183.  See Helen Hershkoff & Stephen Loffredo, State Courts and Constitutional Socio-Economic 
Rights: Exploring the Underutilization Thesis, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 923, 963, 941–62 (2011). 
184.  Id. at 945. 
185.  George D. Brown, Binding Advisory Opinions: A Federal Courts Perspective on the State 
School Finance Decisions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 543, 546 (1994); Jonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers 
and Judicial Review of Positive Rights Claims: The Role of State Courts in an Era of Positive 
Government, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1057, 1096–98 (1993); Alana Klein, Judging as Nudging: New 
Governance Approaches for the Enforcement of Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 39 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 351, 397–402 (2008); Larry J. Obhof, Rethinking Judicial Activism and 
Restraint in State School Finance Litigation, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 569, 593–94, 598–600 
(2004); Rebell, supra note 179, at 1539–42; Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law 
Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355, 1365–76 (1991). 
186.  Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation 
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1019 (2004); see id. at 1082–1110 (“The key characteristics of this 
revised conception of professional decisionmaking are collaborative dialogue, provisionality, and 
transparency . . . .”). 
187.  See Tushnet, supra note 167, at 1910–11. 
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judgments,188 leading some to observe that declaratory and injunctive 
remedies “are rough substitutes” because there are few differences between 
them when prospective relief is sought.189 The two significant differences 
concern judicial management and timing.190 “If the court foresees a need 
for heightened management of the parties, it should grant an injunction.”191 
Otherwise, “the declaratory judgment is preferable,” particularly where it is 
needed “at an earlier stage than the injunction” to “resolve legal uncertainty 
in crossroads dilemmas.”192 
Those crossroads have been reached numerous times in school finance 
cases “of first impression in which a state’s high court is interpreting vague 
and century-old state constitutional language.”193 It cannot be said that the 
courts’ declaratory judgments defining the right to education as a claim-
right in these cases failed to enforce it as such. By giving content to the 
states’ duty, declaratory judgments in these contexts impose legal norms 
more forcefully and directly than nominal claim-rights.194 And particularly 
when the declaration is accompanied by a judicial finding that the state has 
breached its duty, the judgment can be quite coercive despite the absence of 
an immediate sanction for noncompliance. Indeed, in the eight states 
Bauries cites as failing to conceptualize a claim-right to education because 
the courts did not grant injunctions, the legislatures were nevertheless 
spurred by the declaratory judgments to increase school funding.195 One of 
 
188.  See Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1091, 
1110–13 (2014) (“Over the past eighty years, the federal courts have issued thousands of declaratory 
judgments, but the statutory authorization of further relief has been considered in published district 
court opinions in only about seventy-five cases—less than one per year. And . . . the form of ‘further 
relief’ that plaintiffs request from district courts more than any other is attorneys’ fees.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
189.  Id. at 1143; see also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 497 (2d ed. 
1994) (“In practice, declaratory judgments that statutes are unconstitutional appear to have been as 
effective as injunctions against enforcement.”); MICHAEL L. WELLS & THOMAS A. EATON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 185–86 
(2002) (“There is, in fact, little practical difference today between the two remedies, except that an 
injunction can be immediately enforced while a declaratory judgment cannot be.”). 
190.  See Bray, supra note 188, at 1124–43. 
191.  Id. at 1144. 
192.  Id. at 1143–44. 
193.  William S. Koski, The Politics of Judicial Decision-Making in Education Policy Reform 
Litigation, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1077, 1226 (2004). 
194.  Bauries, Common Law Constitutionalism, supra note 15, at 986 (suggesting that declaratory 
judgments in school finance cases often “read like legislation”). 
195.  See Mary J. Amos, DeRolph v. State: Who Really Won Ohio’s School Funding Battle?, 30 
CAP. U. L. REV. 153, 162–63 (2002); Erin E. Buzuvis, “A” for Effort: Evaluating Recent State 
Education Reform in Response to Judicial Demands for Equity and Adequacy, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 
644, 674 (2001) (evaluating legislative responses in New Hampshire and Vermont); Molly A. Hunter, 
Building on Judicial Intervention: The Redesign of School Facilities Funding in Arizona, 34 J.L. & 
EDUC. 173, 188–89 (2005); Robert C. Huntley, Public Education School Funding Litigation in Idaho: A 
Tale of Legislative Irresponsibility and Delay, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 247, 259 (2005); Erin E. Lawson, 
Fulfilling the Promise of Education to South Carolina’s At-Risk Children: A New Preschool Initiative 
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those states, Kentucky, passed what was described as “the most sweeping 
education package ever conceived by a state Legislature” less than a year 
after its high court declared the state in violation of the right to 
education.196 
Even so, the existence of a genuine claim-right should not hinge on 
whether, and to what degree, the legislature acted in response to the court’s 
judgment, be it declaratory or injunctive. Legislatures have resisted full 
compliance with both remedies.197 In theory, courts possess inherent 
powers to issue contempt citations for such disobedience.198 And the 
Supreme Court of Washington has exercised that power, holding the state 
in contempt and eventually imposing a $100,000-a-day fine when the 
legislature failed to fulfill the constitutional mandate.199 Other courts have 
reserved the option of closing public schools entirely until the legislature 
complied.200 But as one state supreme court justice somberly observed in 
contemplating whether legislators could be held in contempt of the court’s 
school funding decisions, enforcement of a contempt order also “poses 
 
in South Carolina, 58 S.C. L. REV. 1025, 1027 (2007); Hillary A. Wandler, Comment, Will Montana 
Breathe Life into Its Positive Constitutional Right to Equal Educational Opportunity?, 65 MONT. L. 
REV. 343, 364 (2004). This is not to say, of course, that the increases in school funding were sufficient 
to satisfy the states’ constitutional duties. 
196.  See Molly A. Hunter, All Eyes Forward: Public Engagement and Educational Reform in 
Kentucky, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 485, 499 (1999) (quoting Edward B. Fiske, The Spring Report; Starting 
Over, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1990, at 34). “The Kentucky decision has been cited or relied on in nearly 
every state education clause case since.” Bauries, Common Law Constitutionalism, supra note 15, at 
984. 
197.  See Black, supra note 2, at 1388 & n.223 (observing that legislative responses to school 
finance decisions are plagued by “unaccountability and unreliability”). See generally Joy Chia & Sarah 
A. Seo, Battle of the Branches: The Separation of Powers Doctrine in State Education Funding Suits, 
41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 125 (2007). 
198.  See Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 796 (1987) (“The ability to 
punish disobedience to judicial orders is regarded as essential to ensuring that the Judiciary has a means 
to vindicate its own authority without complete dependence on other Branches.”); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., 
The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 766–67 
(2001). 
199.  See McCleary v. State, No. 84362–7 (Wash. Sept. 11, 2014) (order of contempt), 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/PublicUpload/Supreme Court News/84362-7 order - 9-11-2014.pdf; 
McCleary v. State, No. 84362–7 (Wash. Aug. 13, 2015) (order imposing fine), 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/843627_081315McClear
yorder.pdf. 
200.  See Hull v. Albrecht, 960 P.2d 634, 640 (Ariz. 1998) (staying injunction that would have 
prevented state from distributing funds to the public school system to afford legislature time to comply 
with decision); Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457, 459 (N.J. 1976) (staying injunction that would have 
enjoined public officials “from expending any funds for the support of any free public school”); 
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood II), 804 S.W.2d 491, 499 (Tex. 1991) (staying 
injunction to shut down the public school system to permit legislature to pass constitutional legislation); 
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood I), 777 S.W.2d 391, 399 (Tex. 1989); Montoy v. State, 
138 P.3d 755, 759 (Kan. 2006) (noting that court issued order to show cause directing the state to 
explain why the court “should not enter an ORDER enjoining the expenditure and distribution of any 
funds for the operation of Kansas schools pending the Legislature's compliance” with its constitutional 
obligations). 
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concerns” because a court “has no concrete powers like the sword 
(executive) or the purse (legislative) with which to carry its judgments into 
effect.”201 A contempt order might also run afoul of legislative immunity 
and separation of powers principles.202 
Bauries thinks that the potential for such inter-branch conflicts, which 
he predicts “the legislature would likely win,” means that “Hohfeldian 
claim-rights to educational resources and services are unworkable, at least 
where such claim-rights run against the state legislature to compel adequate 
funding or resources.”203 But such inter-branch tension inheres in the 
adjudication of nearly every constitutional right; it is not unique to the 
enforcement of the right to education.204 In fact, “federal courts, 
particularly the Supreme Court, have tended to be reluctant not just to 
accord broad structural remedies, but to accord any remedies at all in many 
instances, even when federal constitutional and statutory rights have been 
violated.”205 If constitutional rights have to be fully effectuated by all three 
branches of government before they can take the form of a claim-right, then 
there would be virtually no constitutional claim-rights. 
At bottom, we have reasons to doubt Bauries’s assertion that the right 
to education takes the form of a claim-right in only six states where the 
courts have both articulated it as such and ordered specific performance. 
We can more readily accept his initial observation that the right to 
education takes the form of a claim-right in nearly every state 
constitution.206 Unlike Bauries, I believe that includes the thirteen states 
where the claim-right is nominal either because the highest court has 
 
201.  See DeRolph v. State, 93 Ohio St. 3d 309, 338, 2001-Ohio-1343, 754 N.E.2d 1184, 1211 
(Douglas, J., concurring) (citing Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive 
Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 219 (1994)), vacated, 97 Ohio St. 3d 434, 2002-Ohio-
6750, 780 N.E.2d 529. As Bauries suggests, this perhaps “explains why no state court has gone so far as 
to issue an injunctive order in a school finance suit and to follow through by using its traditional 
contempt power when the order has been flouted by the state legislature.” Bauries, Conceptual 
Convergence, supra note 14, at 354–55. 
202.  See Richard E. Levy, Gunfight at the K–12 Corral: Legislative vs. Judicial Power in the 
Kansas School Finance Litigation, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1021, 1082–83 (2006); see also Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Essential but Inherently Limited Role of the Courts in Prison Reform, 13 BERKELEY 
J. CRIM. L. 307, 314 (2008). 
203.  See Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 355 (emphasis added). 
204.  See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 398–99 (2007) (explaining that courts “limit[] majoritarian 
decisionmaking . . . whenever they vindicate any constitutional right”). 
205.  Marsha S. Berzon, Rights and Remedies, 64 LA. L. REV. 519, 525 (2004); see Barry 
Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 738 
(1992) (contending that “there is tremendous flexibility in the fit between right and remedy” in the 
federal court system, “in which failure to comply with, if not outright defiance of, judicial remedial 
orders is tolerated to a certain degree”); Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2081, 2113 (2005) (“Constitutional rights are systematically ‘underenforced’ by the judiciary, and for 
excellent institutional reasons.” (citing Sager, supra note 139)). 
206.  See Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 325. 
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deemed it nonjusticiable207 or because the court has yet to interpret the right 
in a school funding case, though the text of the state constitution evinces a 
Hohfeldian claim-right–duty correlation.208 With the possible exception of 
Iowa and Indiana,209 the highest courts in the remaining thirty-five states 
have all construed the right to education in the form of a genuine (i.e., 
judicially enforceable) claim-right, including the six identified by Bauries 
that articulated a claim-right and ordered specific performance;210 the eight 
discounted by Bauries that articulated a claim-right but did not order 
specific performance;211 and the twenty-one whose high courts have 
articulated a claim-right notwithstanding the outcome of the litigation or 
whether the state fully complied with its constitutional duty thereafter.212 
 
207.  Courts in seven states have declined to entertain the merits of school finance litigation, 
reasoning that their state constitution education clauses vest discretion in the legislature. See Ex parte 
James, 836 So. 2d 813, 819 (Ala. 2002); Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 
680 So. 2d 400, 406–08 (Fla. 1996); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1190 (Ill. 
1996); Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164, 176 (Neb. 2007); Okla. 
Educ. Ass’n v. State, 2007 OK 30, ¶ 25, 158 P.3d 1058, 1066; Marrero v. Commonwealth, 739 A.2d 
110, 111–12 (Pa. 1999); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 42–43 (R.I. 1995). 
208.  As of this writing, the highest courts of six states—Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Mississippi, 
Nevada, and Utah—have yet to decide a school finance case, and no case appears to be immediately 
forthcoming. See NAT’L EDUC. ACCESS NETWORK, http://schoolfunding.info (last visited Mar. 1, 2016). 
But see Guinn v. Legislature of Nev., 71 P.3d 1269, 1272 (Nev. 2003) (holding that issuance of writ of 
mandamus was warranted directing legislature to proceed with special session to approve balanced 
budget because, inter alia, legislature had failed to fulfill its constitutional mandate to fund education), 
overruled in part by Nevadans for Nev. v. Beers, 142 P.3d 339, 348 (Nev. 2006). Plaintiffs are pressing 
challenges in New Mexico. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Martinez v. State, No. 
D-101-CV-2014-00793 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.maldef.org/assets/pdf/ 
MartinezvNewMexico_Complaint04114.pdf; Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment 
and Injunctive Relief to Bring New Mexico’s Public Schools into Compliance with the Educational 
Mandate of the New Mexico State Constitution, Yazzie v. State, D-101-CV-2014-02224 (N.M. 1st Jud. 
Dist. Ct. July 14, 2015), http://nmpovertylaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Complaint-Yazzie-
Second-Amended-Complaint-2015-07-14.pdf. 
209.  See Bonner ex rel. Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516, 518, 520, 522 (Ind. 2009) 
(acknowledging the General Assembly’s “duty to provide for a general and uniform system of open 
common schools without tuition” but concluding “that the Education Clause of the Indiana Constitution 
does not impose upon government an affirmative duty to achieve any particular standard of resulting 
educational quality” and thus “[t]o the extent that an individual student may have a right, entitlement, or 
privilege to pursue public education, any such right derives from the enactments of the General 
Assembly, not from the Indiana Constitution”); King v. State, 818 N.W.2d 1, 21, 33 (Iowa 2012) 
(declining to decide “whether plaintiffs’ claims under the education clause present a nonjusticiable 
political question” but observing that Iowa Constitution “does not mandate that the legislature provide 
either ‘free public schools’ or an ‘efficient system of common schools’”). 
210.  See Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 333–40 (discussing the decisions 
of state courts in Arkansas, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Washington, and Wyoming). 
211.  See id. at 343–46 (discussing state court decisions in Kentucky, Ohio, South Carolina, New 
Hampshire, Vermont, Montana, Idaho, and Arizona). 
212.  See Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d 391, 402 (Alaska 1997); 
Wells v. One2One Learning Found., 141 P.3d 225, 239 (Cal. 2006); Lobato ex rel. Lobato v. State, 218 
P.3d 358, 372 (Colo. 2009); Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1276 (Conn. 1996); McDaniel v. Thomas, 
285 S.E.2d 156, 164 (Ga. 1981); Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1213 (Kan. 2014); La. Ass’n of 
Educators, 521 So. 2d at 394; Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 1 v. Comm’r, Dep’t of Educ., 659 A.2d 854, 857 
(Me. 1995); Hornbeck v. Somerset Cty. Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 776 (Md. 1983); McDuffy v. Sec’y 
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Note the overlap with the state courts that have construed the right to 
education in the form of an immunity as well.213 As discussed in the next 
section, rights can take the form of a combination of two or more 
Hohfeldian incidents, depending on their function. 
B. The Right to Education’s Functions 
All rights take the form of Hohfeldian incidents (power, privilege, 
immunity, claim-right), but not all Hohfeldian incidents are rights.214 For 
instance, we may have a “privilege not to assault others on the street[, b]ut 
we would balk at saying that each of us has a legal right not to assault 
others on the street.”215 A Hohfeldian incident qualifies as a right, then, if it 
serves a function that “captures our ordinary understanding of what rights 
there are and what significance rights have for rightholders.”216 
 
of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 524 (Mass. 1993); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 
(Minn. 1993); Comm. for Educ. Equal. v. State, 294 S.W.3d 477, 489 (Mo. 2009); Bismarck Pub. Sch. 
Dist. No. 1 v. State ex rel. N.D. Legislative Assembly, 511 N.W.2d 247, 259 (N.D. 1994); Pendleton 
Sch. Dist. 16R v. State, 200 P.3d 133, 139–40 (Or. 2009); Davis v. State, 2011 S.D. 51, ¶ 2, 804 
N.W.2d 618, 623; Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 894 S.W.2d 734, 734 (Tenn. 1995); Edgewood 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1989); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 
141–42 (Va. 1994); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 884 (W. Va. 1979); Vincent v. Voight, 2000 WI 
93, ¶ 38, 236 Wis. 2d 588, 618, 614 N.W.2d 388, 404; Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457, 462 (Mich. 
1972), vacated on other grounds, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973). But see  LM v. State, 862 N.W.2d 
246, 252 (Mich. App 2014) (suggesting state constitution “merely ‘encourage[s]’ education, but does 
not mandate it” and directs responsibility for providing education to local school districts) appeal 
denied sub nom. SS v. State, State Bd. of Educ., Dep't of Educ., 869 N.W.2d 273 (Mich. 2015). 
213.  See supra notes 111, 115–119 and accompanying text. 
214.  See Wenar, supra note 29, at 245. 
215.  Id. at 246. 
216.  See id. at 238. 
Figure A. Immunity-Claim-Right Forms Among the States. 
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For centuries, the two main function theories have been will (or choice) 
theory and interest (or benefit) theory.217 Will theory asserts that the 
function of rights is to protect the autonomy of the rightholder by giving 
her control over another person’s duty.218 Interest theory maintains that the 
function of rights is to advance some of the rightholder’s interests, 
generally conceived as well-being.219 The right to education illustrates why 
neither theory has predominated. 
Will theory cannot account for inalienable rights, like the right to 
education.220 In keeping with the theory, A does not have control over B’s 
duty unless A possesses inter alia the power to waive B’s duty.221 Children 
cannot waive the state’s duty to provide them an education.222 Hence, 
according to will theory, there is no such thing as an inalienable right to 
education—or any inalienable right (to life or liberty) for that matter.223 
Moreover, even if the right to education were alienable, it could not be held 
by children because will theory insists that only competent adults, capable 
of exercising a full range of autonomous choices, possess rights.224 This 
view simply does not fit with our ordinary understanding of children as 
rightholders.225 
Interest theory more plausibly explains the right to education’s function 
because “it can recognize as rights unwaivable claims” and “has no trouble 
 
217.  See id. at 223 & n.1 (citing A DEBATE OVER RIGHTS, supra note 22). The debate between 
proponents of these two theories “stretches back through Bentham (an interest theorist) and Kant (a will 
theorist) into the Dark Ages.” Id. at 238. Although this scholarly contest has been pursued with renewed 
fervor in recent decades, it has effectively ended in a stalemate. Id. at 223 (citing L. W. SUMNER, THE 
MORAL FOUNDATION OF RIGHTS 51 (1987) (describing debate as “standoff”)). 
218.  See Harel, supra note 96, at 194. 
219.  See id. at 195–96. 
220.  See NEIL MACCORMICK, Children’s Rights: A Test-Case for Theories of Right, in LEGAL 
RIGHT AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 154, 154–58 (1982); 
Kramer, supra note 21, at 69–70. 
221.  See H. L. A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 183–84 (1982). In addition to the power to 
waive, the rightholder must also possess the power to enforce the duty and the power to waive the 
obligation to pay compensation for violation of the duty. Id. 
222.  See Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education Off the Grid: Constitutional Constraints on 
Homeschooling, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 123, 155 (2008) (“[S]tate constitutional education obligations, like 
other constitutional obligations with broad social purposes, are appropriately nonwaivable.”); see also 
Howard Klepper, Mandatory Rights and Compulsory Education, 15 LAW & PHIL. 149 (1996). To be 
sure, parents or guardians can “waive” the state’s duty to provide a publicly funded education to their 
children, but the duty itself is not relinquished; it is merely assumed by the parent or guardian to pay for 
private education or homeschool the child. Therefore, the right to education remains inalienable. Cf. 
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1852–53 (1987) (explaining that 
the different “meanings of inalienability share a common core: the notion of . . . an entitlement, right, or 
attribute . . . that cannot be lost or extinguished”). 
223.  See Harel, supra note 96, at 195–96. 
224.  See id.; Dailey, supra note 69, at 2100 n.3 (citing authors who have discussed the 
application of will theory to the exclusion of children). 
225.  Some have contended that will theory’s failure to conceive of children as rightholders 
completely undercuts the theory. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 21, at 69–70; MACCORMICK, supra note 
220, at 154. 
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viewing children . . . as rightholders, since children [also] have interests 
that rights can protect.”226 Yet interest theory fails for another reason: 
namely, that rights often advance the interests of others besides the 
rightholder, raising doubts that the rightholder’s interests are sufficient to 
justify the right.227 “The right to free speech,” for instance, “is often 
ascribed to the speaker, or the potential speaker, but the justifications for 
protecting it are often grounded in the interests of other persons, or even 
the interests of the society as a whole.”228 
Such is the case with the right to education: the interests of children 
advanced by providing them an education have not been sufficient to 
ground the right.229 Rather, the right to education is often justified as 
necessary to preserve other rights of citizens and a republican form of 
government as well as to sustain a market economy.230 Even when courts 
have seemingly invoked the intrinsic value of education in progressing a 
 
226.  Wenar, supra note 29, at 241. 
227.  See Harel, supra note 96, at 194. 
228.  Id. at 196. 
On Raz’s variant of the interest theory the existence of a right turns not on the purpose of the 
right’s ascription, but on the sufficiency of the rightholder’s interests in justifying the right’s 
normative impact . . . . Yet this attempt to add the interests of the public to the interest of the 
[rightholder] merely highlights the fact that the [rightholder’s] interest is in itself insufficient 
to ground this right. 
Wenar, supra note 29, at 242 (footnote omitted); see also Gopal Sreenivasan, A Hybrid Theory of 
Claim-Rights, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 266 (2005) (objecting to Raz’s version of interest 
theory because “it instrumentalizes the individual’s status as right-holder . . . [and thus] fails to take the 
status of right-holder seriously enough” (footnote omitted)). 
229.  See Yuracko, supra note 222, at 154 (“[S]tate constitutional education obligations serve 
social goals and purposes that go well beyond the interests of any individual child.”). 
230.  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (“We have repeatedly acknowledged the 
overriding importance of preparing students for work and citizenship . . . .”); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 
202, 221 (1982) (“[E]ducation provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically 
productive lives to the benefit of us all.”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (“[S]ome 
degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our 
open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence.”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education 
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. . . . It is the 
very foundation of good citizenship.”); Yuracko, supra note 222, at 155 (“Courts interpreting these state 
constitution clauses have similarly emphasized the democracy- and citizenship-promoting purposes of 
the clauses as well as their importance for economic prosperity.”); Weishart, supra note 30, at 520 & 
n.237 (citing “courts favoring adequacy [that] have stressed the importance of preparing students to be 
competitive in higher education and/or in the job market”); Eli Savit, Note, Can Courts Repair the 
Crumbling Foundation of Good Citizenship? An Examination of Potential Legal Challenges to Social 
Studies Cutbacks in Public Schools, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1293–94 (2009) (“The education 
provisions in Indiana and New Hampshire celebrate ‘knowledge and learning’ as ‘essential to the 
preservation of a free government,’ while Idaho, Minnesota, and South Dakota’s provisions declare that 
the ‘stability of a republican form of government’ depends mainly on the ‘intelligence of the people.’ 
Six other states’ education provisions draw on John Adams’s language in the Massachusetts 
Constitution of 1780, and assert that the general diffusion of knowledge among the people is essential to 
‘the preservation of [their] rights and liberties.’ Three more state provisions see an educated populace as 
‘necessary to good government.’ And North Dakota’s education provision makes the nexus between 
democracy and education explicit . . . .” (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)). 
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child’s personal development, self-knowledge, and capacity to flourish,231 
they have suggested that these ends ultimately serve the common good.232 
If children’s interests are insufficient to justify the right to education, then 
the interest theory also fails to fit with our ordinary understanding of the 
right’s function. 
Leif Wenar contends that will and interest theories err in conceiving of 
rights as serving only a single function, autonomy or well-being.233 
Moreover, will and interest theories unacceptably limit the Hohfeldian 
incidents that qualify as rights. Will theorists typically identify a right as 
composed of a claim-right coupled with a power to decide whether to 
waive or enforce the claim-right.234 Although interest theory potentially 
could include the other Hohfeldian incidents (privilege and immunity), its 
two leading theorists have defended it based on the notion that only claim-
rights qualify as rights.235 Adhering to the view that rights should be 
thought of “in the strictest sense” as claim-rights (or, at most, claims-rights 
and powers) does not fit our ordinary understanding of rights taking the 
form of important immunities (e.g., equal protection) and privileges (e.g., 
freedom to marry).236 
Accordingly, Wenar proposes the “several functions theory,” which 
“holds that any [Hohfeldian] incident or combination of incidents is a right, 
but only if it performs one or more of [these] six functions”—exemption, 
 
231.  See Regina R. Umpstead, Determining Adequacy: How Courts Are Redefining State 
Responsibility for Educational Finance, Goals, and Accountability, 2007 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 281, 307 
& nn.161–74 (citing, inter alia, Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 
1989); McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993); Claremont 
II, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 94 (Wash. 1978); 
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979)). 
232.  See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 211 (“Any system of common schools must be created and 
maintained with the premise that education is absolutely vital to the present and to the future of our 
Commonwealth.”); McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 524 (“The immediate purpose of the establishment of the 
duty is the spreading of the opportunities and advantages of education throughout the people; the 
ultimate end is the preservation of rights and liberties. Put otherwise, an educated people is viewed as 
essential to the preservation of the entire constitutional plan: a free, sovereign, constitutional democratic 
State.”); Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1359 (“These guidelines accord with our Constitution’s emphasis on 
educating our children to become free citizens on whom the [State] may rely to meet its needs and to 
further its interests.” (alteration in original) (quoting McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 555)); Seattle Sch. Dist. 
No. 1, 585 P.2d at 94 (“Education plays a critical role in a free society. It must prepare our children to 
participate intelligently and effectively in our open political system to ensure that system’s survival.”); 
Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 884 (“But the feature of the instrument that demonstrates most clearly the spirit 
of enlightened patriotism and enlarged sense of genuine interest in the cause of humanity, was the 
liberal provision for the establishment of a system of free schools.” (quoting 1 W. Va. Preface)). 
233.  Wenar, supra note 29, at 224. 
234.  See Cruft, supra note 53, at 367. 
235.  See id. at 370, 377. 
236.  See Wenar, supra note 29, at 243 & n.36 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“It is only 
philosophers of law who speak a ‘strict’ dialect of rights . . . . [And the only reason they do so] is to 
rescue one of the single-function theories from counterexamples.” (citation omitted)). 
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discretion, authorization, protection, provision, and performance.237 The 
several functions theory accounts for the right to education better than will 
and interest theories. 
1. For Children, no “Authorization,” “Exemption,” or “Discretion” 
Hohfeldian powers and privileges are “active” in the sense that they 
must be exercised by the rightholder and concern the rightholder’s own 
actions (signaled by statements like “A has a right to phi”).238 Rights taking 
the form of powers impart authorization “to alter the normative situation of 
oneself or another” by creating, waiving, or annulling one’s own or 
another’s claim-rights and privileges.239 In that sense, a “single power” is 
nondiscretionary (e.g., A has right to annul B’s privilege) while a “paired 
power” is discretionary (e.g., A has right to create or annul B’s 
privilege).240 
When a right takes the form of a privilege, it confers the rightholder 
with one of two functions. In the case of a “single privilege,” the function 
is an “exemption from a general duty” (e.g., A owes B “no duty not[] to” 
speak).241 In the case of a “paired privilege,” like the paired power, the 
function is “discretion, or choice, concerning some action” (e.g., A owes B 
“no duty []not[] to” speak and A owes B “no duty . . . to” speak).242 
None of the above functions properly describe children’s right to 
education. Children lack authorization to alter their own or anyone else’s 
claim-rights and privileges vis-à-vis public education, and they are not 
exempt from the general duty to receive an education. Although parents 
and guardians are afforded some discretion regarding the choice of public 
or private education (assuming these options exist and are financially 
available), that limited discretion also fails to fully capture the function of 
the right to education that runs to children. 
2. For Children, a Right of “Performance” and “Provision” 
Hohfeldian claim-rights and immunities are “passive” in the sense that 
they concern the actions of others and are enjoyed rather than exercised by 
the rightholder (signaled by statements like “A has a right that B phi”).243 
 
237.  Id. at 246. 
238.  See id. at 233 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, “‘phi’ is an 
active verb.” Id. at 225. 
239.  Id. at 231. 
240.  See id. 
241.  Id. at 226. 
242.  Id. at 226–27. 
243.  Id. at 233 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Rights taking the form of claim-rights denote functions of “protection 
against harm or paternalism,” “provision in case of need,” and “specific 
performance of some agreed-upon, compensatory, or legally or 
conventionally specified action.”244 Immunities serve the same protection 
function as claim-rights.245 
That the right to education necessitates performance and provision is 
generally uncontested. “In the legislative context,” Bauries suggests that 
the conduct that must be performed pursuant to the state’s duty “is the act 
of legislating” or “making policy” under the state education clause.246 No 
doubt perceived legislative inaction has incited school finance lawsuits and 
prompted courts to intervene in response to either the initial challenge or 
subsequent challenges after the state failed to comply with the court’s 
directives.247 But, as Bauries keenly observes, school finance challenges 
“do not really go to legislative inaction” because, in fact, “legislatures have 
acted”—they “have simply acted in ways that the plaintiffs claim [are 
inadequate or] exceed the legislative discretion expressed or implied in the 
education clause.”248 
Similarly, “every state constitution contains an education clause 
mandating the provision of a free, public education,”249 and all states have 
fulfilled that function by providing a free, public education system. So, “in 
no case is any legislature accused of failing to provide for an education 
system. Rather, each case presents a challenge to the legislature’s decision 
as to how much funding to provide and how to allocate it.”250 That 
challenge turns on the degree to which the right to education serves the 
protection function. 
 
244.  Id. at 229. 
245.  See id. at 232. 
246.  Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 311. Presumably, in the executive 
context, the conduct would be administering education policy (e.g., establishing a curriculum, 
resourcing schools, teaching). 
247.  See Jonathan Banks, Note, State Constitutional Analyses of Public School Finance Reform 
Cases: Myth or Methodology?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 129, 154–55 (1992) (concluding that “frustration 
with continual legislative inaction is implicit in virtually every [school finance] case” and that “[o]nly 
when courts conclude that their legislature is unwilling or unable to pass effective remedial legislation 
will they intervene”); see also Sonja Ralston Elder, Standing Up to Legislative Bullies: Separation of 
Powers, State Courts, and Educational Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 755, 758 (2007) (examining “three 
alternative court reactions to legislative inaction through the school financing experiences in Ohio and 
New Jersey, in New York and North Carolina, and in Nevada”). 
248.  Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 351. 
249.  James E. Ryan & Thomas Saunders, Foreword to Symposium on School Finance Litigation: 
Emerging Trends or New Dead Ends?, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 466 (2004) (emphasis added). 
But see Umpstead, supra note 231, at 289 n.20 (contending that “Iowa’s constitution is the only state 
constitution to make no provisions for educational responsibilities”); cf. King v. State, 818 N.W.2d 1, 
14 (Iowa 2012) (observing that prior court precedent found that “no aspect of the Iowa Constitution, 
including the education clause, authorized the legislature to provide for public schools (as opposed to 
merely funding them)”). 
250.  Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 351. 
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Table B. Wenar’s Several Function Theory. 
 
Active Passive 
Power  Authorization to alter the normative 
situation of oneself or another 
Immunity  Protection against harm 
Privilege  Exemption from a general duty 
Discretion concerning some action 
Claim-Right  Protection against harm  
Provision in case of need  
Performance of some agreed-
upon compensatory or specified 
action 
3. For Children, a Right of “Protection” 
Despite the passage of more than forty years, there is still no definitive 
answer to the question left undecided by Rodriguez: is there a federal 
constitutional right to “some identifiable quantum of education”?251 
Rodriguez’s successors—Plyler, Papasan, and Kadrmas—failed to settle 
the matter,252 as scholars as noted.253 Nevertheless, there should be no 
doubt that, if there is a federal constitutional right to education, its principal 
function is to protect children and, thereby, society at large. 
The need to protect African-American children from the stigmatic 
harms of discrimination precipitated the Court’s declaration in Brown that 
the right to education “must be made available to all on equal terms” and 
its holding that state-imposed, racially segregated schooling is “inherently 
unequal.”254 The Court’s allusion to a right to education in Rodriguez came 
by way of a response to the argument that “an opportunity to acquire [] 
 
251.  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973). 
252.  Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221, 224 (1982) (reiterating that “education is not a ‘right’ 
granted to individuals by the Constitution” but applying heightened scrutiny to invalidate statute 
denying public education to undocumented children as violative of the Equal Protection Clause); 
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986) (“As Rodriguez and Plyler indicate, this Court has not yet 
definitively settled the questions whether a minimally adequate education is a fundamental right and 
whether a statute alleged to discriminatorily infringe that right should be accorded heightened equal 
protection review.”). But see Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988) (“Nor have we 
accepted the proposition that education is a ‘fundamental right,’ like equality of the franchise, which 
should trigger strict scrutiny when government interferes with an individual’s access to it.”). 
253.  See, e.g., Bitensky, supra note 6, at 567–73; Boyce, supra note 5, at 1050–51; Greenspahn, 
supra note 12, at 769; Robinson, supra note 11, at 1683–84; James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and 
Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1392–94 (2000); Emily Barbour, Note, Separate and Invisible: 
Alternative Education Programs and Our Educational Rights, 50 B.C. L. REV. 197, 216 (2009). 
254.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493, 495 (1954); see Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, 
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 350–51 
(1987). “In education cases following Brown, we see racial stigma being defined as a citizenship-like 
harm, a matter of psychological harm, or both.” R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, 
and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 869–70, n.341 (2004) (citing cases). 
1 WEISHART 915-978 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/19/2016  1:43 PM 
2016] Reconstituting the Right to Education 957 
basic minimal skills [is] necessary” to protect “the enjoyment of the rights 
of speech and of full participation in the political process.”255 And, the 
Court’s invalidation of a statute denying a “basic” public education to 
unauthorized immigrants was regarded in Plyler as vital to protecting those 
children from the “social economic, intellectual, and psychological” harms 
occasioned by absolute educational deprivation.256 The Court elaborated 
that among the harms that should be averted were “[t]he stigma of 
illiteracy” and the creation of a “subclass of illiterates” who would lack the 
“ability to live within the structure of our civic institutions” and “surely 
add[] to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime.”257 
Although emanating from state education rights and compulsory 
attendance laws, the Court has also recognized that children possess 
property and liberty interests in public education that must be protected by 
the Due Process Clause.258 Again, the Court’s concern was with the harms 
associated with being deprived of an education, remarking that “total 
exclusion from the educational process for more than a trivial period, [e.g., 
a suspension] for 10 days, is a serious event in the life of the suspended 
child.”259 
Taken together, the Court’s decisions suggest that the federal 
constitutional right to education, should it exist, at least takes the form of 
an immunity against state-imposed racial segregation as well as a claim-
right to a “basic” public education that cannot be denied without due 
process. This immunity-claim-right’s function is to afford protection 
against the harms of racial discrimination and educational deprivation. 
The protection function is relatively more pronounced in the states that 
have translated the right to education as a safeguard against the harms of 
inequitable or inadequate distributions of educational opportunities.260 
 
255.  Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37. The Court accepted the State of Texas’s assurances that it was 
providing every child with “an adequate education.” Id. at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
256.  Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221–22. Social science research overwhelmingly confirms the Court’s 
reflection about the indispensable role of education in contemporary life. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, 
HUMAN CAPITAL (3d ed. 1993); David Card, The Causal Effect of Education on Earnings, in 3 
HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 1801 (O. Ashenfelter & D. Card eds., 1999); THE SOCIAL BENEFITS 
OF EDUCATION (Jere R. Behrman & Nevzer Stacey eds., 1997); Paul W. Kingston et al., Why Education 
Matters, 76 SOC. EDUC. 53 (2003); Philip Oreopoulos & Kjell G. Salvanes, Priceless: The 
Nonpecuniary Benefits of Schooling, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 160 (2011); Richard L. Wobbekind, On 
the Importance of Education, 47 BUS. ECON. 90, 91 (2012). 
257.  Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223, 230. 
258.  See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572–76 (1975). 
259.  Id. at 576; see Brent E. Troyan, Note, The Silent Treatment: Perpetual In-School 
Suspension and the Education Rights of Students, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1637, 1645–46 (2003). 
260.  Cf. Derek W. Black, Civil Rights, Charter Schools, and Lessons To Be Learned, 64 FLA. L. 
REV. 1723, 1777–78 (2012) (observing that state “courts have framed these cases in terms of how much 
is at stake for disadvantaged students” and “in describing the long-term effects of inequitable and 
inadequate education on society”); Michael A. Rebell, Safeguarding the Right to a Sound Basic 
Education in Times of Fiscal Constraint, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1855, 1866 (2012) (“Plaintiffs’ success in 
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Some courts stressed the latter; without equality of educational opportunity, 
children are denied an equal chance to succeed in their education, in the job 
market, and in their civic and social lives.261 Other courts, less convinced 
that the right to education can or should afford equal life chances, 
nevertheless insist that there should be adequate educational opportunities 
such that children have an effective chance to succeed educationally, 
economically, politically, and socially.262 
Notwithstanding this superficial rift between equality and adequacy, 
courts adopting either standard (or both) essentially perceive the need to 
protect children from being disadvantaged in life by disparities in 
educational opportunity.263 And virtually all of the state courts that have 
addressed it recognize that inequitable or inadequate distributions of 
educational opportunity threaten the exercise and enjoyment of other 
constitutional rights, productive and responsible citizenship, and an 
efficient market economy.264 Hence, by protecting children, the right to 
education is also meant to protect the rights of everyone to benefit from and 
participate in a democratic, capitalist society. 
Yet despite its import, the protection function has been obfuscated in 
the right to education’s jurisprudence. Though it seems integral to the 
Supreme Court’s conception of a federal right to education, the Court 
remains ambivalent about whether such a right even exists. What’s more, 
the putative federal right’s protection function is largely inoperative as a 
result of subsequent precedent that effectively ended desegregation 
litigation265 and because arguably all states provide at least a “basic” 
education.266 Moreover, unlike the right’s performance and provision 
 
these cases has been based on evidence that demonstrated a wide-spread pattern of inequities and 
blatant educational inadequacies, primarily affecting low-income and minority students, in states 
throughout the country.”). 
261.  See, e.g., Serrano I, 487 P.2d 1241, 1257 (Cal. 1971) (“Unequal education, then, leads to 
unequal job opportunities, disparate income, and handicapped ability to participate in the social, 
cultural, and political activity of our society.”) (quoting S.F. Unified Sch. Dist. V. Johnson, 479 P.2d 
669 (Cal. 1971))). 
262.  See, e.g., Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV), 693 A.2d 417, 428 (N.J. 1997) (“[A] 
constitutionally adequate education has been defined as an education that will prepare public school 
children for a meaningful role in society, one that will enable them to compete effectively in the 
economy and to contribute and to participate as citizens and members of their communities.”). 
263.  See James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 
1223, 1237 (2008) (contending that courts in school finance cases “focus on disparities and seek to 
ensure rough comparability” of resources and opportunities). 
264.  See sources cited supra note 232. Of special note, one court has construed its state 
constitution’s guarantee of equal educational opportunity to include a protection from the harms of 
racial segregation—whether the product of de jure or de facto discrimination. See Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 
A.2d 1267, 1287–90 (Conn. 1996). 
265.  See Black, supra note 260, at 1732–38. 
266.  See Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1770 n.264 (2006) 
(“The debate over the citizenship-enabling aspects of education has been muted on a federal level by 
the existence of state constitutional provisions.”). 
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functions, which are plainly expressed or implicit in the education clauses 
of state constitutions, the protection function has been conveyed mainly 
through judicial interpretations of those clauses, and often by deduction—
inferred from language in the clauses about the quality of education 
required, e.g., “thorough,” “efficient,” “suitable,” “adequate,” “general,” 
“uniform.”267 The protection function has also been unsettled as a result of 
the equality and adequacy divide. Yet, as explored below, the protection 
function actually serves to unite those doctrines. 
C. Children’s Right to Education: An Immunity-Claim-Right with a 
Protection Function 
Depending on who is regarded as the rightholder, the constitutional 
right to education has taken the form of all four Hohfeldian incidents and at 
least five of the six Wenarian functions.268 Courts have partially formulated 
the right to education as a power held by the state, imparting authorization 
to create, waive, or annul children’s claim-rights and privileges within the 
bounds of the Constitution. Courts have also formulated the right to 
education as a privilege held by parents and guardians, conferring a 
qualified discretion to elect a public or private education for their children 
and to maintain some degree of control over their children’s education. 
Although power-authorization and privilege-discretion are essential 
elements of the right to education, it is the sequence of the forms and 
functions of the right held by children that transmits the right’s distinctive 
ethos. 
As expressed in the text of state constitutions and construed by several 
state courts, the right to education held by children takes the form of a 
claim-right to the state’s performance and provision of educational 
opportunities. Owed to its status as a fundamental right in some states and 
by judicial application of state equal protection guarantees, the right held 
by children has also taken the form of an immunity. Note that the right to 
education would be a fairly meager entitlement for children if the analysis 
were to end there—if, as Bauries surmises, the right has been 
operationalized primarily to satisfy the provision and performance 
functions such that states simply have affirmative duties to provide an 
 
267.  See Umpstead, supra note 231, at 290–91. 
268.  Cf. Randall Curren, Right to an Education, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EDUCATIONAL THEORY 
AND PHILOSOPHY 712, 713 (D.C. Phillips ed. 2014) (“The universal right to free and compulsory 
elementary education . . . would be a constellation of privileges to take advantage of opportunities to 
learn; claim on others (one’s parents, government, and to some extent the international community) to 
provide what is required for a suitable elementary education; immunity to others altering this privilege 
and claim and no power to waive, annul, or transfer the right (making it inalienable); and no privilege to 
not cooperate in learning opportunities others have a duty to provide (making the education 
compulsory).”). 
1 WEISHART 915-978 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/19/2016  1:43 PM 
960 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 67:4:915 
education and to legislate, and that claim-right is paired with a modest 
immunity, disabling only arbitrary legislative action.269 
My analysis concludes that the right has more bite because of the 
immunity-claim-right’s shared protection function. As explained below, we 
can perceive educational adequacy as the theoretical backbone of that 
claim-right. Conversely, the immunity is linked by the principle of equality 
of educational opportunity. The sum of these revelations expose the right to 
education, not as a beautiful swan in the making but as a mutant of sorts; 
and that may be a good thing. 
II. EQUALITY AND ADEQUACY ≅ EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS  
The right to education invites controversy because it provokes 
questions of distributive justice.270 Such questions lie at the heart of the 
decades-long, equality–adequacy debate: does the right require equal 
distributions of educational opportunities among all children or adequate 
distributions such that children have access to a certain threshold of 
educational opportunities?271 Understandably, in this context, there is a 
tendency to presume the right to education takes the form of a claim-right 
and concentrate on its provision function.272 As a matter of principle, we 
may think any provision of educational opportunities that is unequal is, a 
fortiori, immoral. Or, we may find unequal provisions acceptable from a 
 
269.  Bauries thinks the right to education is better construed to impose fiduciary duties of loyalty 
and due care on state legislatures. See Bauries, Education Duty, supra note 15, at 741–52. As such, 
judicial enforcement should be directed not at “the specific adjectives contained in a state’s education 
clause but at the general goal these terms attempt to reflect—a system that educates the people as the 
beneficiaries of a public educational trust.” Id. at 756. To that end, “courts should limit initial review to 
process, rather than substance” and consider whether “the legislature has essentially abdicated its role 
by failing to act at all in the face of obvious needs, or by acting without due care by failing to consider 
relevant, material, and available information about the state's existing education system's needs and 
flaws.” Id. at 762, 763. As Bauries concedes, “such a deferential approach will make plaintiff victories 
significantly rarer,” but he maintains “challenge[s] to an entire legislative scheme based on the 
substantive terms of a state’s education clause should meet a high burden.” Id. at 763. 
270.  See generally THE “INEQUALITY” CONTROVERSY: SCHOOLING AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
(Donald M. Levine & Mary Jo Bane eds., 1975). 
271.  See Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources and the 
Constitutional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373, 395–96 (2012); Michael Heise, Equal 
Educational Opportunity, Hollow Victories, and the Demise of School Finance Equity Theory: An 
Empirical Perspective and Alternative Explanation, 32 GA. L. REV. 543, 545 (1998). 
272.  See Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 303–304 & n.15 (“Much of the 
scholarly work in existence focuses on the justiciability and remediability of ‘education rights,’ or on 
the quantitative and qualitative entitlements that school children should have pursuant to the state 
constitution’s education clause.”); Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under 
State Constitutions when the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights are Deeply 
Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 108 (2008) (“We think it is fair to 
construe [the education] clauses [in state constitutions in 1868] as in effect guaranteeing individuals a 
right to some kind of government provision of a public-school education.” (emphasis added)). 
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moral standpoint provided that all children have enough educational 
opportunities. 
Apart from moral conviction, however, our sense of a just provision of 
educational opportunities is frequently informed by beliefs about the kinds 
of measures “necessary to protect children from unfairness in the 
competition for postsecondary admission and jobs and from suffering 
potential dignitary harms” on account of social inequalities.273 That is, 
when pressed to rationalize abstract notions of educational justice, we 
speak in terms of the right to education’s protection function. Indeed, as 
previously observed, state courts have seemingly justified decisions finding 
school finance schemes unconstitutional by explaining that equal or 
adequate educational opportunities are essential to protecting children’s life 
chances, citizenship, and dignity and, in so doing, protect the rights, 
benefits, and opportunities of everyone in a democratic capitalist society. 
Although the protection function influences our sense of distributive 
justice in education, it has not been the exact focus of much scholarly 
attention, perhaps because it is so lofty, but more likely because it has been 
obscured. If, as previously explained, Supreme Court precedent and the text 
of state constitutions obfuscate the protection function, what grounds it in 
the adjudication of the right to education? Without overtly addressing 
protection as a distinct function, scholars have looked primarily to due 
process and equal protection guarantees as sources for an implied right to 
education in the U.S. Constitution or to reinforce the right’s standing in 
state constitutions. Other constitutional collaterals have been proposed—
the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, the implied right to vote, the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Citizenship Clause, the Ninth 
Amendment274—but due process and equal protection are the two most 
frequently nominated, and rightfully so. Together, liberty and equality 
represent the values, norms, and interests that the right to education is 
meant to protect. 
A. Liberty Through Educational Adequacy 
Taking the form of a privilege conferring parents and guardians 
discretion over a limited range of choices (e.g., public versus private 
education), the right to education secures liberty in a negative sense—
 
273.  William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When “Adequate” Isn’t: The Retreat from Equity in 
Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 611 (2006) (emphasis added); see 
Enrich, supra note 13, at 167; Liu, supra note 7, at 345–46 (endorsing educational adequacy as essential 
to ensuring children’s citizenship rights and equal dignity). 
274.  See FARBER, supra note 8; Bitensky, supra note 6; Liu, supra note 7; Millonzi, supra note 
7. 
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freedom from.275 But when the right takes its distinctive form as a claim-
right held by children, it functions to protect liberty in a positive sense—
freedom to be.276 The link between education and positive liberty is most 
palpable in state constitutions that express the right to education as a 
safeguard of democracy.277 Several courts have so construed the right even 
absent explicit language in the state constitution.278 The link is also implied 
in Rodriguez and Plyler, as previously discussed.279 In either respect, the 
notion is that education is part of the state’s “formative project” in 
cultivating children with capabilities to be responsible citizens who can 
fortify their own liberties and, in turn, the liberties of others.280 
Beyond education for citizenship, a few state constitutions explicitly 
emphasize the economic importance of education to “commerce, trades, 
[and] manufactures”281 as well as “vocational,”282 “mining,”283 
“agricultural,”284 “scientific,”285 and “industrial”286 improvements. Where 
state constitutions do not declare such purposes explicitly, courts have 
explained that education is essential to preparing “students to compete for 
and perform in their future career pursuits” and thereby “contribute to the 
economy.”287 Again, the idea being that the state has some obligation to 
 
275.  See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 121–22 
(1969). 
276.  See id. 
277.  See Savit, supra note 230, at 1293–94 (reciting language of fifteen state constitutions that 
“endorse the view that education’s importance is bound up in the participatory nature of democracy”). 
278.  See, e.g., Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 812 (Ariz. 
1994); Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1017 (Colo. 1982); Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 
1267, 1289 (Conn. 1996); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 165 (Ga. 1981); Rose v. Council for 
Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 206 (Ky. 1989); Hornbeck v. Somerset Cty. Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 
758, 785–86 (Md. 1983); McNair v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 288 P. 188, 190 (Mont. 1930); Robinson ex rel. 
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (N.J. 1973); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 
N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ohio 1997); Tenn. Small Sch. 
Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 150–51 (Tenn. 1993); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 393 (Vt. 
1997); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 94 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 
877 (W. Va. 1979). 
279.  See supra Part I.B.3. 
280.  See JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, 
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES 115 (2013); see also Foley, supra note 10, at 515–20; Areto A. 
Imoukhuede, Education Rights and the New Due Process, 47 IND. L. REV. 467, 469, 474–75, 480–81, 
485–91 (2014); Liu, supra note 7, at 344–48. 
281.  MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. V, § II; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83. 
282.  KAN. CONST. art. 6, § 1. 
283.  NEV. CONST. art. 11, § 1. 
284.  IND. CONST. art. 8, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 11, § 1; see also MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. V, § II; 
N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83. 
285.  IND. CONST. art. 8, § 1; KAN. CONST. art. 6, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 11, § 1; see also MASS. 
CONST. pt. 2, ch. V, § II; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83. 
286.  N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; see also MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. V, § II. 
287.  Umpstead, supra note 231, at 308–09 & nn.175–85 (citing Pinto v. Ala. Coal. for Equity, 
662 So. 2d 894, 896 (Ala. 1995); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 
1989); McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993); Claremont 
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endow children with capabilities to be productive members of the 
economy.288 
Being the state’s civilizing engine of democracy and catalyst for 
economic efficiency,289 education has instrumental value as a public or 
collective good.290 But courts adjudicating the right to education have also 
recognized education’s intrinsic value as a private, individual good that 
should be enhanced by nurturing children’s capabilities to be autonomous 
generally—through personal and moral development, mutual 
understanding, self-knowledge, and the capacity to flourish in society.291 
The nexus between education and positive liberty has been propagated 
in decisions interpreting state constitutions to require educational adequacy. 
In the most influential of those decisions, the Supreme Court of Kentucky 
determined that an adequate education is one that instills “seven capacities” 
enabling children to, inter alia, “function” in society, “make informed 
choices” and “understand the issues” as responsible citizens, and “compete 
favorably” in their education and the job market.292 The Kentucky decision 
has been “adopted or relied on in nearly every other successful state court 
case for . . . two decades nationwide, regardless of differences in the 
substantive language of the education clauses among the states.”293 
Given this emphasis on inculcating capacities or capabilities, scholars 
inevitably noted educational adequacy’s theoretical resemblance to the 
 
II, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997); Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 485, 487 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. 
State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979)). 
288.  See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (“[E]ducation provides the basic tools by which 
individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all.”). 
289.  See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (accepting propositions that “some 
degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our 
open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence [and that] education prepares 
individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society”). 
290.  See Derek W. Black, Charter Schools, Vouchers, and the Public Good, 48 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 445, 448 n.17 (2013) (referring to education as public or collective good in a non-economic sense 
because in economic terms a public good is nonrivalrous and nonexcludable and “certain aspects of 
education do not meet these criteria”); David F. Labaree, Public Goods, Private Goods: The American 
Struggle over Educational Goals, 34 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 39, 51 (1997). 
291.  See Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 877; Umpstead, supra note 231, at 307 & nn.161–74 (citing 
Pinto, 662 So. 2d at 896; Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212; McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 554; Claremont II, 703 
A.2d at 1359; Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 94 (Wash. 1978)); see also Koski & Reich, 
supra note 273, at 598 (“To be sure, education brings intrinsic benefits to the individual. Education is 
an absolute, not positional, good insofar as those who have education gain more skills, capabilities, and 
talents; they are better able to pursue their goals and make use of their freedom. Capabilities and talents 
acquired through education are typically understood to be noncompetitive and non-zero sum.”). See 
generally HARRY BRIGHOUSE, SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 65–82, 121 (2000) (examining 
“The Case for Autonomy-Facilitating Education” and “intrinsic benefits” of education); Kai Möller, 
Two Conceptions of Positive Liberty: Towards an Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional Rights, 29 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 757 (2009). 
292.  Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212. 
293.  Bauries, Education Duty, supra note 15, at 760. 
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capability approach advanced by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum.294 
Positive liberty, the freedom to be (and to do), is central to that approach. 
Sen describes capabilities as a person’s “substantive freedoms”—i.e., real 
opportunities—to achieve valued functionings (“beings and doings,” e.g., 
being educated, being well nourished, having self-respect, voting, working, 
taking part in the life of the community).295 “At the heart of the [capability 
approach] since its inception has been the importance of education,”296 as 
both a basic capability (enhancing real opportunities to achieve) as well as 
a valued functioning (an actual achievement in itself).297 
Scholars endorsing the capability approach do not believe that justice 
requires equal levels of functioning—for instance, “that everyone must 
have [and achieve] the same education.”298 Rather, leading capability 
theorists favor “equality for all in the space of capabilities” accomplished 
by guaranteeing a minimum threshold of capabilities.299 Hence, much like 
proponents of educational adequacy, these capability theorists have as their 
distributive rule some version of the sufficiency doctrine, emphasizing the 
importance of ensuring capabilities up to a certain threshold but 
presumptively negating the moral significance of inequalities above that 
threshold.300 
 
294.  See Imoukhuede, supra note 280, at 482–83, 489–90; Liu, supra note 7, at 342, 346–47; 
Lisa R. Pruitt, Human Rights and Development for India’s Rural Remnant: A Capabilities-Based 
Assessment, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803, 844–46 (2011); see also Melanie Walker & Elaine 
Unterhalter, The Capability Approach: Its Potential for Work in Education, in AMARTYA SEN’S 
CAPABILITY APPROACH AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN EDUCATION 2 (2007); Madoka Saito, Amartya Sen’s 
Capability Approach to Education: A Critical Exploration, 37 J. PHIL. EDUC. 17 (2003). 
295.  See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 18, 75 (1999); AMARTYA SEN, 
INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 39–40 (1992) [hereinafter SEN, INEQUALITY]; Amartya Sen, Well-Being, 
Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984, 82 J. PHIL. 169, 201–03 (1985). 
296.  MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 
152 (2011); see also SEN, INEQUALITY, supra note 295, at 44 (describing education as one of “a 
relatively small number of centrally important” beings and doings that are crucial to well-being). 
297.  See Walker & Unterhalter, supra note 294, at 7; Imoukhuede, supra note 280, at 482 & 
n.97. 
298.  Martha C. Nussbaum, The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Foreword: Constitutions and 
Capabilities: “Perception” Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 5, 69 (2007). 
299.  Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 316 (1999); see 
Rosalind Dixon & Martha C. Nussbaum, Children’s Rights and a Capabilities Approach: The Question 
of Special Priority, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 554 (2012) (“[Capabilities approach] is generally 
committed to the equal protection of rights for all up to a certain minimum threshold.”); Nussbaum, 
supra note 298, at 69. “In grappling with requirements of adequacy versus equality of capabilities, 
Nussbaum generally advocates only adequacy in relation to socioeconomic-type rights”; regarding 
“education and health care, however, she suggests that ‘adequacy does appear to require something 
close to equality.’” Pruitt, supra note 294, at 811 n.30 (quoting MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF 
JUSTICE 294 (2006)). 
300.  See Weishart, supra note 30, at 512 (citing Paula Casal, Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough, 117 
ETHICS 296, 297–98 (2007)). 
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Surely the least objectionable construction of the right to education is 
one that embraces this threshold account.301 There is simply no denying 
that education has “a constitutive presence, being central to enhancing 
agency and autonomy, and in the contemporary world essential for 
avoiding subjugation and exploitation by others.”302 Thus, it takes no great 
leap for courts to construe the right to education in the form of a claim-
right to at least an adequate education, one that functions to protect 
children by instilling basic capabilities—real opportunities to achieve or 
positive liberties that enable responsible citizenship, economic 
productivity, personal development, and self-respect. 
B. Equality Through Equal Educational Opportunity 
Taking the form of an immunity, the right to education has been 
understood to protect against certain types of inequalities or inequities. 
Brown’s broad declaration that “the opportunity of an education . . . is a 
right which must be made available to all on equal terms”303 initially held 
the promise of advancing substantive equality of educational opportunity. 
Yet, as mentioned, the Court’s subsequent decisions narrowed Brown’s 
reach to forbid only de jure segregation, curbing the right to protect formal 
equality—via an immunity against intentional, state-imposed, racial 
discrimination.304 
Following Rodriguez, the mantle fell to state courts adjudicating school 
finance challenges to give further meaning to equal educational 
opportunity. Early decisions retained the emphasis on securing formal 
equality, immunizing children from discrimination based on the wealth of 
the school district they happened to reside in.305 The remedy for unequal 
spending was “either horizontal equity among school districts, such that 
per-pupil revenues were roughly equalized by the state, or at least fiscal 
neutrality, such that the revenues available to a school district would not 
depend solely on the property wealth of the school district.”306 
As advocates and courts began to realize, however, there were two 
main defects with equality as horizontal equity or fiscal neutrality: (1) 
nothing prevented states from leveling down education spending overall to 
 
301.  See Enrich, supra note 13, at 166–83. 
302.  TRISTAN MCCOWAN, EDUCATION AS A HUMAN RIGHT: PRINCIPLES FOR A UNIVERSAL 
ENTITLEMENT TO LEARNING 62 (2013). 
303.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
304.  See Weishart, supra note 30, at 499. 
305.  See id. at 500. 
306.  William S. Koski & Jesse Hahnel, The Past, Present, and Possible Futures of Educational 
Finance Reform Litigation, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION FINANCE AND POLICY 41, 46 
(Helen F. Ladd & Margaret E. Goertz eds., 2d ed. 2015) (emphasis added). 
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achieve it, and (2) it did not actually protect disadvantaged children who 
required not equal but more spending to even approximate the educational 
opportunities and attainment of their peers.307 
Concurrent with legislative efforts to provide compensatory resources 
and services to disadvantaged children, such as Title I, the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act, and the No Child Left Behind Act, state courts 
gradually began to articulate a substantive brand of equal educational 
opportunity, conferring an immunity against inequitable (as opposed to 
unequal) spending.308 Vertical equity, as it is frequently termed in the 
literature, is “a remedial school finance scheme that aims to mitigate 
natural and social disadvantages by allocating greater resources to the 
neediest students.”309 The motivating principle being that 
all students should have an equal chance to succeed, with actual 
observed success dependent on certain personal characteristics, 
such as motivation, desire, effort, and to some extent 
ability . . . [and not] on circumstances outside the control of the 
child, such as the financial position of the family, geographic 
location, ethnic or racial identity, gender, and disability. 310 
This principle of “equal life chances”—similar to Rawls’s “fair 
equality of opportunity” and later procured by contemporary luck 
egalitarians—has maintained a hold on lawmakers, judges, and believers in 
the American Dream.311 It bespeaks a sense of fairness about the proper 
determinants for success in life312 and, even more fundamentally, about 
how to treat people with “equal concern and respect.”313 In that regard, 
education is still seen as a “great equalizer,” an instrument for leveling the 
playing field.314 
Although the principle of equal life chances enjoys broad appeal, it is 
impossible to achieve. Equal chances for educational success cannot be 
realized “without completely neutralizing all of the differential effects of 
social circumstances (e.g., race, class, and gender) and natural endowments 
 
307.  See Weishart, supra note 30, at 501–04. 
308.  See id. at 504–07. 
309.  Id. at 481. 
310.  Robert Berne & Leanna Stiefel, Concepts of School Finance Equity: 1970 to the Present, in 
EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 7, 13 (Helen F. Ladd et 
al. eds., 1999). 
311.  See Weishart, supra note 30, at 485–86 & nn.33–35, 488–89, 495, 532. 
312.  See JAMES S. FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND THE FAMILY 31 (1983) (“The 
basic intuition is that it seems unfair that we should be able to predict eventual positions in a society 
merely by knowing the strata into which children are born.”). 
313.  RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 273 (1977). 
314.  HORACE MANN, TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT (1948), reprinted as END POVERTY THROUGH 
EDUCATION (1848), in HORACE MANN ON THE CRISIS IN EDUCATION 119, 124 (Louis Filler ed., 1965). 
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(innate talents and (dis)abilities) on every child’s chances.”315 There are not 
enough resources to accomplish such a feat, and even if there were, 
chances for educational success would still be unequal so long as family 
life remains a prevalent influence on a child’s prospects—that is, so long as 
parents retain the liberty to raise children in diverse ways.316 
Although the underlying principle itself is practically infeasible, there 
can be no denying the moral and political force of school policies that 
promote greater vertical equity overall.317 Allocating resources in an 
attempt to at least mitigate natural and social disadvantages is fairer—and 
shows more concern and respect—than ignoring or aggravating those 
disadvantages, whereas failing to demand equitable educational 
opportunities only serves to perpetuate political, economic, and social 
inequalities that erode human dignity. Hence, several state courts have 
construed the right to education in the form of an immunity that protects 
children from the detrimental effects of inequitable distributions of 
educational resources.318 
Despite the focus on resource equity in school finance litigation, for 
many the notion of equal educational opportunity still signifies equality in 
one important sense: racial and socioeconomic integration. Based on 
extensive social science evidence, James Ryan, Derek Black, and other 
scholars have urged school finance litigants to incorporate “an argument 
that racial and socioeconomic integration are necessary components of a 
student’s constitutional right to an equal or adequate education.”319 Alas, 
“only a handful of advocates have even attempted” to make that argument, 
which to date has prevailed in only one state court decision.320 Still, 
scholars continue to argue persuasively that the social equality achieved 
through integration is just as important, if not more important, than 
resource equity to student achievement. 
 
315.  Weishart, supra note 30, at 532–33, 509–10. 
316.  See id. 
317.  Cf. William S. Koski, Courthouses vs. Statehouses?, 109 MICH. L. REV. 923, 927 (2011) 
(book review) (“Further evidence of the coming-of-age of school-finance policy research and advocacy 
is the agreement among the camps that additional educational resources must be allocated to students of 
greater need and that school-finance formulas should account for those needs.”). 
318.  See Weishart, supra note 30, at 505–06, 540 (discussing state court decisions employing 
vertical equity principles); see also R. CRAIG WOOD, EDUCATIONAL FINANCE LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGES TO STATE AID PLANS—AN ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES 18 (3d ed. 2007) (noting that 
school finance formulas in many states reflect attempts to incorporate both horizontal and vertical 
equity). 
319.  James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 308 (1999); see Black, 
supra note 271, at 374 n.9; 386 n.80 (citing other scholars who have advanced and examined the 
implications of this argument). 
320.  See Black, supra note 271, at 375. 
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C. “The Inadequacy of Equal Protection”321 
Judicially imposed limitations on federal equal protection guarantees 
have received renewed attention in recent years.322 Among the most 
frequently criticized limitations are “the rigid tiers of scrutiny” and “the 
requirement for a discriminatory purpose in order to prove 
discrimination.”323 State courts have contended with these limitations in 
adjudicating equality-based school finance challenges.324 
Most of the state courts in “lockstep” with federal equal protection 
doctrine have applied “the rational basis/strict scrutiny dichotomy and 
parrot[ed] the holdings of Rodriguez as to the non-fundamental nature of 
education rights and the non-suspect nature of wealth-based 
classifications.”325 Others in lockstep have nevertheless “held that, under 
their respective state constitutions, education is a fundamental right or 
interest or that wealth is a suspect classification.”326 The few courts that 
have diverged entirely from the federal approach have done so “in 
counter[]intuitive ways.”327 
Apart from the strictures of the federal doctrine, the inadequacy of 
equal protection is evident in “the struggle of courts to resolve how the 
concept of equality should be defined and measured”—and particularly 
whether equal protection entails “formal and substantive equality.”328 This 
struggle has persisted for decades in the school finance context, perplexing 
scholars, courts, and legislatures alike.329 If equal protection demands 
 
321.  Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak Its 
Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1907 (2004). 
322.  See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal Protection 
Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059 (2011); Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2012 Term—
Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2013); Tribe, supra note 321, at 1907–08; Kenji 
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011). 
323.  Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 322, at 1076; see also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality 
Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (2004). 
324.  See Scott R. Bauries, Foreword: Rights, Remedies, and Rose, 98 KY. L.J. 703, 705 (2010) 
(“Thus, courts were asked to determine whether education was a fundamental right in the state, or 
whether (real property) wealth was a suspect classification, on the way to deciding whether to apply 
strict scrutiny to legislative decisions allocating educational resources unequally . . . .”); see also 
Derrick Darby & Richard E. Levy, Slaying the Inequality Villain in School Finance: Is the Right to 
Education the Silver Bullet?, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 351, 358 (2011) (“Since lawmakers know 
better than to employ racial classifications explicitly (or to reveal their discriminatory intent publicly), it 
is hard to challenge school finance laws under a racial classification theory even if they produce 
substantial racial inequalities.”). 
325.  Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 14, at 330. 
326.  Id. at 331. 
327.  Id. For instance, by “holding education to be a fundamental right but upholding their state 
systems under strict scrutiny or (inexplicably) rational basis review.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
328.  Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 322, at 1063–64. 
329. See Enrich, supra note 13, at 144–55 (critiquing equality measures considered by courts and 
legislatures); William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re-Examination of 
the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1185, 
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formal equality, then it “does not protect against inadequate funding, 
provided that inadequacy is equally shared.”330 Nor does it require (as 
opposed to permit) that education spending be adjusted to the needs of 
differently situated children,331 and thus it fails to protect those who need it 
most. 
If, however, equal protection demands substantive equality on the order 
of vertical equity, then it poses implementation and management 
problems.332 “For once a court agrees to impose a remedy based upon 
vertical equity, upon what basis should it rely to authorize or limit how 
much more money a low-income school or student should receive than an 
affluent one?”333 Answering that question seems to turn on “determining 
what set of knowledge and skills schools should teach to each student” and 
“what types of supplemental assistance students with special needs 
require[] and how much that assistance will cost.”334 
 
1203–11 (2003) (examining scholarship defining equal educational opportunity as horizontal equity, 
vertical equity, “effective equality,” and fiscal neutrality). 
330.  Darby & Levy, supra note 324, at 360; see also Imoukhuede, supra note 280, at 498 (“The 
primary weakness of the Equal Protection Clause as the Court is currently interpreting it, is that rights 
may be violated, so long as they are violated equally.”). 
331.  See Henry Ordower, Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxation as Constitutional 
Principles: Germany and the United States Contrasted, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 259, 294 (2006) (“The Court 
has never held that equal protection requires vertical equity . . . .”); see also Tico A. Almeida, 
Refocusing School Finance Litigation on At-Risk Children: Leandro v. State of North Carolina, 22 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 525, 553 (2004) (“While normatively appealing, few courts have proven willing 
to find a constitutional mandate for extra resources for the students with the greatest needs.”). But see 
Preston C. Green & Bruce D. Baker, Circumventing Rodriguez: Can Plaintiffs Use the Equal 
Protection Clause to Challenge School Finance Disparities Caused by Inequitable State Distribution 
Policies?, 7 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 141 (2002). 
332.  See Koski, supra note 329, at 1206; see also Robinson ex rel. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 
273, 283 (N.J. 1973) (“We hesitate to turn this [school finance] case upon the State equal protection 
clause. The reason is that the equal protection clause may be unmanageable if it is called upon to supply 
categorical answers in the vast area of human needs, choosing those which must be met and a single 
basis upon which the State must act.”); McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 335 (N.D. Ill. 1968) 
(rejecting school finance challenge seeking vertical equity distributions based on children’s needs 
because it could not discern “‘discoverable and manageable standards’ by which a court can determine 
when the Constitution is satisfied and when it is violated” (footnote omitted) (quoting Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 557 (1964))). 
333.  Aaron Y. Tang, Broken Systems, Broken Duties: A New Theory for School Finance 
Litigation, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1195, 1205 (2011); see also Aaron Jay Saiger, The Last Wave: The Rise 
of the Contingent School District, 84 N.C. L. REV. 857, 891 (2006) (suggesting “obvious rejoinder” to 
question of how much more spending vertical equity would require is “much, much more”). 
334.  Ryan & Saunders, supra note 249, at 472; cf. Helen F. Ladd, Reflections on Equity, 
Adequacy, and Weighted Student Funding, 3 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 402, 411 (2008) (noting one of the 
“thorny problems of implementation . . . is that the appropriate weights should in principle vary with the 
outcome standard”); Robert K. Toutkoushian & Robert S. Michael, An Alternative Approach to 
Measuring Horizontal and Vertical Equity in School Funding, 32 J. EDUC. FIN. 395, 397–98 (2007) 
(observing limitation of vertical equity metrics is that some “do not have specific targets that can be 
used to determine whether vertical equity has been reached”). 
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D. The Inequity of Due Process 
Substantive due process has also been sidelined by its elusiveness.335 
“Nearly fifty years after the Supreme Court revived the doctrine, its 
historical origins and precise meaning—to say nothing of its relationship to 
the constitutional text—remain as obscure as ever.”336 In spite of, or 
perhaps because of, its obscurity, the doctrine garnered renewed interest 
following Lawrence v. Texas.337 Some commentators even suggested that 
Lawrence illuminated a path toward the recognition of a federal right to 
education.338 No doubt we can expect similar exploration following 
Obergefell given the Court’s reliance on substantive due process in 
recognizing the fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry.339 
The notion that substantive due process underpins an affirmative, 
liberty-based right to education is not new; it has been suggested for 
decades.340 Substantive due process is triggered by state compulsory 
education laws that restrict not only children’s negative liberties341 but 
profoundly shape their positive liberties as well.342 Educational deprivation 
causes “social economic, intellectual, and psychological” harms that may 
 
335.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1501 (1999) 
(“There is no concept in American law that is more elusive or more controversial than substantive due 
process.”). 
336.  Joshua D. Hawley, The Intellectual Origins of (Modern) Substantive Due Process, 93 TEX. 
L. REV. 275, 276 (2014) (footnote omitted). 
337.  Aaron J. Shuler, From Immutable to Existential: Protecting Who We Are and Who We Want 
To Be with the “Equalerty” of the Substantive Due Process Clause, 12 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 220, 
316–17 (2010) (“Lawrence provoked a torrent of scholarship, a significant portion of which discussed 
the liberty/equality analysis Justice Kennedy conducted under the substantive due process rubric.” 
(footnote omitted)); see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
338.  See Brunell, supra note 10, at 345–46 (“Lawrence represents a sea change in the Court’s 
substantive due process analysis, and as a result, decisions such as . . . Rodriguez are no longer on firm 
footing.”); Imoukhuede, supra note 280, at 468 (“Ironically, Lawrence, which is a negative-rights and 
liberty-based holding, can serve as the template for recognizing the positive right of access to public 
education.”); see also Note, A Right to Learn?: Improving Educational Outcomes Through Substantive 
Due Process, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1323, 1327 (2007) (“[A]lthough substantive due process rests on a 
shaky foundation, recent Supreme Court decisions not only have reaffirmed its legitimacy, but also 
might have expanded its scope.” (footnotes omitted)). 
339.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599–2602 (2015). 
340.  See Bitensky, supra note 6, at 579–96; Gillespie, supra note 10, at 1018; Gershon M. 
Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. 
REV. 777, 823–28 (1985). 
341.  See Ratner, supra note 340, at 824–25 (“State mandated school attendance laws deprive 
students of their basic liberty interests in freedom of movement and freedom of association.” (footnote 
omitted)); Note, supra note 338, at 1330–31 (“Compulsory education laws infringe on a student’s 
undeniably broad liberty interests by precluding the student from pursuing activities that would 
otherwise be possible and by forcing a certain type of instruction upon the student.”). 
342.  Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (“Without doubt, [liberty] denotes not 
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual . . . to engage in any of the 
common occupations of life, [and] to acquire useful knowledge . . . .”). 
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be fairly attributed to the state’s denial of an adequate education.343 Under 
federal substantive due process precedent, the threat of these state-created 
dangers imposes an affirmative duty on states to protect children from such 
harms.344 Alternatively, under another line of federal precedent, failing to 
provide an adequate education bears no reasonable relation to the express 
purpose of infringing children’s liberty interests in order to educate them 
and thus violates substantive due process.345  
Federal precedent aside, nothing of course “precludes the states from 
interpreting [the substantive due process provisions of] their own 
constitutions to provide an affirmative state duty of protection.”346 Yet few 
state courts have given substantive due process serious consideration.347 As 
a basis for challenging educational disparities, it has been rejected in at 
least two states.348 And, although it has been reserved as a potential basis 
for a constitutional violation in other states, the predicates for such a 
violation would have to be the absolute denial of a minimally adequate 
education349 or arbitrary and capricious school funding distributions.350 
Even if Lawrence and now Obergefell give the substantive due process 
argument new tread, it is unlikely to gain much traction in education cases. 
The problem with substantive due process is not that the doctrine itself is 
too elusive or that the Court’s precedents cannot support its application. 
Ultimately, the problem vis-à-vis the right to education is that “substantive 
due process decisions typically rest essentially or entirely on claims of 
 
343.  Cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221–22, 252 (1982).  
344.  See Note, supra note 338, at 1333–34 (discussing DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)). 
345.  See King v. State, 818 N.W.2d 1, 66 (Iowa 2012) (Appel, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 
338, at 1336–37 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)). 
346.  Robert Deichert, Note, Honoring the Social Compact: Arguing for A State Duty of 
Protection Under the Connecticut Constitution, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1069, 1079 (2001). 
347.  See David V. Abbott & Stephen M. Robinson, School Finance Litigation: The Viability of 
Bringing Suit in the Rhode Island Federal District Court, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 441, 478 
(2000) (“Some plaintiffs have attempted to rely on substantive due process claims in school finance 
cases, but so far with little success.”). 
348.  See Lewis v. Spanolo, 710 N.E.2d 798, 812 (Ill. 1999); King, 818 N.W.2d at 31–34; see 
also Woonsocket Sch. Comm. v. Chafee, 89 A.3d 778, 794 (R.I. 2014) (concluding complaint that 
alleged inadequacies in school funding formula failed to present facts to demonstrate violation of 
substantive due process). 
349.  See Montoy v. State, 62 P.3d 228, 235 (Kan. 2003); Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. 
State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1150 (Okla. 1987). 
350.  See Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 258 (N.C. 1997); cf. Citizens of Decatur for Equal 
Educ. v. Lyons–Decatur Sch. Dist., 739 N.W.2d 742, 762 (Neb. 2007) (rejecting substantive due 
process claim because appellants “failed to show that a heightened level of scrutiny applies to the 
school district’s decisions or that those decisions were not rationally related to a legitimate government 
purpose”). 
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noncomparative right.”351 As the Court has put it: “‘Due process’ 
emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the 
State, regardless of how other individuals in the same situation may be 
treated. ‘Equal protection,’ on the other hand, emphasizes disparity in 
treatment by a State between classes of individuals whose situations are 
arguably indistinguishable.”352 
Consequently, a liberty-based right to education grounded solely in 
substantive due process could tolerate wide disparities in educational 
opportunities among students provided that each individual student has 
what the state deems to be an adequate share.353 Indeed, this is one of the 
main criticisms leveled against adequacy—that, because it is, at least in 
theory, not “comparative or relational,”354 it permits significant advantages 
in the competition for college admissions and jobs (i.e., positional goods) 
to be conferred on students who receive more than the adequate level of 
educational opportunities.355 In short, adequacy encased in due process 
licenses and exacerbates a great inequity. 
E. Due Process and Equal Protection for the Right to Education 
Much has been written about the erratic yet enduring relationship 
between equality and liberty in the constitutional jurisprudence of equal 
protection and substantive due process.356 Even more will be written 
regarding their “synergy” given its professed significance to the Court’s 
 
351.  Kenneth W. Simons, Equality as a Comparative Right, 65 B.U. L. REV. 387, 478 (1985); 
see also Raleigh Hannah Levine & Russell Pannier, Comparative and Noncomparative Justice: Some 
Guidelines for Constitutional Adjudication, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 141, 147 (2005). 
352.  Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974) (emphasis added). 
353.  Cf. Arthur E. Wise, Minimum Educational Adequacy: Beyond School Finance Reform, 1 J. 
EDUC. FIN. 468, 477 (1976) (“A substantive due process interpretation [of the right to education] would 
mean only that protection needs to be provided up to a certain level.”). 
354.  Koski & Reich, supra note 273, at 589. 
355.  See id. at 607; Weishart, supra note 30, at 521–22. 
356.  See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 73 (1996); David E. Bernstein, Bolling, Equal Protection, Due Process, and 
Lochnerphobia, 93 GEO. L.J. 1253 (2005); Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1491 (2002); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal 
Protection, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1183 (2000); James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive 
Constitution, 72 TEX. L. REV. 211 (1993); Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New 
Jurisprudence of Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817 (2014); Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due 
Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473 (2002); Kenneth L. 
Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99 
(2007); Shuler, supra note 337; Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion 
Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation 
and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1161 (1988); Tribe, supra note 321; Richard B. Wilson, The Merging Concepts of Liberty 
and Equality, 12 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 182 (1955); Yoshino, supra note 322. 
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reasoning in Obergefell.357 It may be counterproductive to expect one 
direction-of-fit or elaborate theory that can account for all of the intricacies 
and nuances of the evolving relationship between these doctrines, as the 
Court itself seems to acknowledge in Obergefell.358 And yet the tortuous 
saga of the right to education suggests that the makeshift bonds of liberty 
and equality can fasten in the adjudication of a constitutional claim-right-
immunity imparting a protection function. 
That function was the primary justification for state constitutional 
rights to education359 and has been the prevailing rationale for the putative 
federal right to education. Although the latter was last given effect more 
than thirty years ago in Plyler, the Court continues to express the 
constitutional importance of protecting children from economic and 
stigmatic harms, as it did most recently and prominently in Obergefell.360 
Perhaps most importantly, the protection function theoretically links the 
two strands of the right to education held by children—the claim-right to an 
adequate education and the immunity of equal educational opportunity. 
Separately, equality and adequacy as distributive principles have been 
suboptimal in serving the protection function.361 Together, they have made 
more progress.362 Still, “it is difficult to find a consistent relationship 
between [them] in the law [because] decisions in this area often are far 
from models of clarity, and doctrines within a state can and do change over 
time.”363 Moreover, equality and adequacy intertwined can lose their 
sustaining power in the face of legislative resistance and remaining doubts 
about the judiciary’s role in enforcing the right.364 “At least three state 
 
357.  See 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015). 
358.  See id. (“The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a 
profound way, though they set forth independent principles. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured 
by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always co-extensive, yet in some 
instances each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other.”). 
359.  See ZACKIN, supra note 169, at 72–73 (examining history of state constitutional education 
provisions and observing that such provisions were often justified as means to protect children from 
effects of poverty and to protect republican forms of government). 
360.  See 135 S.Ct. at 2600 (“A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards 
children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and 
education.”). 
361.  See Laurie Reynolds, Uniformity of Taxation and the Preservation of Local Control in 
School Finance Reform, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1835, 1844 (2007) (“[N]either the equality nor the 
adequacy ‘wave’ of litigation has produced the desired results even on the heels of ostensible judicial 
victory.” (footnote omitted)); Ryan, supra note 263, at 1229–30 (observing difficulties that equity and 
adequacy decisions each present.). 
362.  See Jensen, supra note 13, at 27 (“[T]he largest group, in terms of sheer numbers of 
successful plaintiffs [in school finance litigation], has used a hybrid [equality and adequacy] 
approach.”). 
363.  Richard Briffault, Adding Adequacy to Equity, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL 
PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 25, 31 (Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007). 
364.  See id. at 44 (“[T]he adequacy theory tends to stretch the limits of the institutional 
competence and power of courts that define adequacy 
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supreme courts [adopting adequacy and vertical equity have] backed down 
and accepted state actions (and inactions) that arguably fell short of both 
adequacy and equity.”365 In the final analysis, the difficulty lies in vague 
education clauses in state constitutions that do not fix standards for 
mutually enforcing equality and adequacy.366 
Pairing the right to education with either substantive due process or 
equal protection separately would not yield acceptable standards. Equal 
protection compelling vertical equity through the right to education’s 
immunity form would disable legislative actions that result in resource 
inequities yet fail to impose any affirmative duty on the state to meet a 
qualitative educational threshold. As previously discussed, a singular focus 
on vertical equity would thus render the right to education an 
unmanageable and inadequate protection.367 Indeed, in most states where 
equal protection guarantees were deemed coextensive with the state 
constitution’s education clause and plaintiffs initially prevailed, courts have 
since abandoned enforcement altogether368 or, more often, embraced the 
need for a qualitative educational threshold, i.e., adequacy.369  
Conversely, substantive due process paired with the right to 
 
define an ‘adequate’ education, to appraise the sufficiency of state measures to oversee and finance 
local provision of such an education, and to force state legislatures to give a greater priority to 
education than the legislators themselves would prefer.”); Ryan & Saunders, supra note 248, at 472 
(“Expanding the remedy [of vertical equity and adequacy] risks diluting [their] impact by spreading 
resources too thinly and thus compromising their effectiveness. . . . Defining what constitutes an 
adequate education . . . [and] determining what types of supplemental assistance students with special 
needs require . . . [may] strain the competency of the courts.”). 
365.  Briffault, supra note 363, at 46 (referencing Arkansas, Massachusetts, and Ohio); see also 
Koski & Reich, supra note 273, at 570 (“[T]he vertical-equity-minded remedies of the Abbott litigation 
[in New Jersey] have been only seldom and half-heartedly deployed in other cases.”). 
366.  See generally Bauries, Common Law Constitutionalism, supra note 15, at 997 (“The 
education clauses in state constitutions . . . constrain courts to a certain set of possible interpretations, 
even though no state constitutional education clause appears to explicitly mandate a particular 
conclusion as to the nature or the quantum of the educational entitlements it sets up.”); Bauries, 
Education Duty, supra note 15, at 729–31, 755, 762; Koski, supra note 317, at 932–33; Koski, supra 
note 329; William S. Koski, The Evolving Role of the Courts in School Reform Twenty Years After 
Rose, 98 KY. L.J. 789, 799 & n.30 (2009–2010). 
367.  See DUNCAN MACRAE, JR. & JAMES WILDE, POLICY ANALYSIS FOR PUBLIC DECISIONS 66 
(1979) (contending that vertical equity is difficult to apply because “[n]ot only do we have to identify 
reasons for treating people unequally, but we must also decide how unequally they should be treated”); 
Koski, supra note 329, at 1206 (“As a judicial standard . . . vertical equity would pose a serious 
problem for manageability on a case-by-case basis.”); Ryan & Saunders, supra note 249, at 476; supra 
note 332–334 and accompanying text. 
368.  See Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813, 817–19 (Ala. 2002).  
369.  See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 495 (Ark. 2002); Conn. 
Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 227 (Conn. 2010); Neeley v. W. Orange–
Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746 (Tex. 2005); State v. Chafin, 376 S.E.2d 113, 121 
(W.Va. 1988); Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279 (Wyo. 1995). Courts in 
California, Tennessee, and Vermont are the exception because they construed their equal protection 
guarantees more in line with horizontal equity or fiscal neutrality than with vertical equity. See Serrano 
v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 953 (Cal. 1976); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 894 S.W.2d 734, 738 
(Tenn. 1995); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 390, 397 (Vt. 1997). 
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education’s claim-right form would impose an affirmative duty on the state 
to meet a qualitative threshold yet otherwise tolerate resource inequities 
and social inequalities. Again, as discussed, the noncomparative nature of 
substantive due process would therefore abide and potentially magnify 
educational disparities.370 Although no appellate court has utilized 
substantive due process in finding a violation of a state constitutional right 
to education, the experience of state courts that have endorsed adequacy 
suggests that at some point disregarding inequalities simply becomes 
indefensible. Hence, courts have not enforced “some absolute notion of 
adequacy, where disparities in resources are ignored” but rather have 
demanded “substantial equality.”371      
Coalesced within the right to education’s immunity-claim-right 
structure, substantive due process and equal protection together could 
offset their respective limitations and ameliorate the right’s enforcement 
standards to synchronize the protection of children’s liberty and equality 
interests. Tethered to the right to education’s claim-right form, substantive 
due process exerts leverage in the demand for a qualitative adequacy 
threshold—whether explicitly or implicitly required by the state 
constitution or not372—to protect children’s negative liberties (freedom 
from educational deprivation) and positive liberties (freedom to be 
responsible, productive, autonomous citizens). The substantive standards 
could alleviate some of the manageability concerns by providing a 
“baseline of adequacy”373 from which the vertical equity required by equal 
protection can be measured and adjusted.374  
 
370.  See supra notes 353–354 and accompanying text; see also Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the 
Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 1001 n.98 (1979) (“[S]ubstantive due 
process . . . speaks to substantive liberties, without direct regard to the inequality of their distribution.”); 
Michael J. Phillips, Another Look at Economic Substantive Due Process, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 265, 281 
(1987) (contending that inequalities perpetuated by economic substantive due process led to its demise). 
371.  Ryan, supra note 263, at 1237 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
372. Cf. Chris Lott, The Methodological Middle Ground: Finding an Adequacy Standard in 
Alaska’s Education Clause, 24 ALASKA L. REV. 73, 88 n.113 (2007) (observing that some states with 
“the strongest education clauses have failed to find a constitutional standard of adequacy while other 
states with weaker Education Clauses have found a constitutional promise of adequacy” (citation 
omitted)). 
373.  Ryan & Saunders, supra note 249, at 472. 
374.  See Peter Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and Morals: A Reply, 
81 MICH. L. REV. 604, 637 n.66 (1983) (“[S]tandards of substantive due process . . . provide the 
substance by which equalities and inequalities are determined.”); see also Colleen Fahy, Education 
Funding in Massachusetts: The Effects of Aid Modifications on Vertical and Horizontal Equity, 36 J. 
EDUC. FIN. 217, 231 (2011) (noting that measuring vertical equity requires identifying spending targets 
in relation to “the level of spending needed to insure adequacy for each student category [though 
probably] the best that can be done is to measure a state’s performance against its own goals”); Gloria 
M. Rodriguez, Vertical Equity in School Finance and the Potential for Increasing School 
Responsiveness to Student and Staff Needs, 79 PEABODY J. EDUC. 7, 17 (2004) (suggesting that for 
purposes of vertical equity “one possibility is to define educational need as the difference between 
where students should be performing academically and the level at which they are currently performing 
[or] assess the necessary structural and instructional changes required for students to access a common 
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Equal protection, in turn, pivots the analysis to educational disparities. 
First, it guarantees vertical equity in the distribution of educational 
opportunities. As a result, equal protection will necessitate “funding to 
compensate for differences in regional costs and student needs” and thus 
“tend to focus disproportionate resources on [disadvantaged] students” to 
afford them a meaningful opportunity to meet the adequacy threshold.375 
Second, it intercedes when the disparities between children at the threshold 
and children above it become objectionable. That is, when such disparities 
imperil equal liberty by undermining children’s capabilities “to function as 
equal citizens and compete for admission to higher education and high-
quality jobs” on comparable terms.376 This would implicate both 
substantive due process, requiring adequacy thresholds to be set higher to 
diminish positional advantages held by those above the threshold, and 
equal protection, requiring adjustments in the distribution of educational 
opportunities to ensure vertical equity necessary to meet the higher 
thresholds.377 In short, equal protection translates the adequacy required by 
substantive due process into a relational or comparative demand.378  
Hence, adjudicating the right to education “stereoscopically—through 
the lenses of both [due process and equal protection]—can have synergistic 
effects, producing results that neither clause might reach by itself”379 or that 
the right to education can have unassisted. 
Inasmuch as the Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process Clauses 
“further[] our understanding” of the “central precepts” of liberty and 
equality entailed by the “right to marry,”380 they can do the same for the 
right to education. It may be fair to characterize the resulting amalgamation 
as an “equality-based and relationally situated theory of substantive 
 
curriculum and foundational learning experiences”); Meaghan Field, Note, Justice as Fairness: The 
Equitable Foundations of Adequacy Litigation, 12 SCHOLAR 403, 409 (2010) (“[I]n cases where the 
resources were provided in full and educational equality remained out of reach, adequacy suits allow 
plaintiffs to recalibrate the resources, measuring what is needed by how far the performance fell short of 
equity and asking for more.”). 
375.  Weishart, supra note 30, at 539–40 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. William S. 
Koski, Achieving “Adequacy” in the Classroom, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 13, 21–22 (2007) (“In 
modern adequacy cases, the most evident manifestation of needs-based rights comes in the methods 
used in costing-out an adequate education, that is, attaching a price tag to the resources necessary for all 
children to reach specified educational outcomes.”); Koski, supra 329, at 1235 (suggesting that when 
“legislatures or courts talk about adequacy for a particular student or narrowly defined class of 
students . . . they [are] talking about what the student needs in order for the education to be adequate for 
their needs”). 
376.  Weishart, supra note 30, at 537–38.  
377.  Cf. id. at 534, 539–40.  
378.  Cf. Ladd, supra note 334,  at 416 (suggesting potential “compromise between equity and 
adequacy . . . is to focus on adequacy as the primary goal, to permit some disparities above the adequate 
level, but to limit the magnitude of those disparities, particularly those funded from public revenue”); 
Weishart, supra note 30, at 528. 
379.  Karlan, supra note 356, at 474. 
380.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–04 (2015). 
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liberty.”381 Or, to put it less eloquently, the right to education would remain 
a mutant of sorts, an aberration in the constitutional order. Yet reconstituted 
with its constitutional cognates, the right to education could be more 
responsive, adaptive, and sustainable. 
CONCLUSION 
Irony is not argument, but it can have the same therapeutic effect. I 
conclude with two ironies. First, had it not been for Rodriguez, the right to 
education might never have been apprehended as a Hohfeldian claim-right. 
That is, had the Court recognized a federal constitutional right to equal 
educational opportunity implicating only the Equal Protection Clause, then 
state courts likely would have similarly construed state rights to education 
(assuming those courts had reason to interpret state constitutions at all 
given the supremacy of the federal right). Hence, the right to education 
held by children might have been formulated solely as an immunity. 
Instead, Rodriguez prodded state courts to focus on the education 
provisions in state constitutions and therein perceive the right in its form as 
not only an immunity to equal educational opportunity but a claim-right to 
an adequate education. 
Second, rather than promote Brown as the standard-bearer for the right 
to education, early state court advocates might have fared better parlaying 
its oft-criticized companion, Bolling v. Sharpe,382 decided the same day. 
Although it has been condemned as a politically contrived opinion,383 the 
Court’s conspicuous reflection in Bolling—that “the concepts of equal 
protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of 
fairness, are not mutually exclusive”384—certainly bears scrutiny. The 
question that remains, left unanswered by Obergefell, is precisely what 
 
381.  Tribe, supra note 324, at 1898. Alexandra Natapoff perceived a version of this 
amalgamation in an article addressing the underenforcement of criminal laws in urban areas. Natapoff 
proposed that the right to education could serve as a model for dealing with the underenforcement 
problem, observing that  
the dual commands of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, as well as the 
language of most state constitutions, have shaped the education debate into a dual inquiry of 
adequacy and equality. The former represents a due process or minimal entitlements type of 
challenge: Has the state provided an adequate minimum threshold of education? The second 
is a comparative inquiry reflecting equality demands: Has the state provided equal access to 
education as between jurisdictions or groups? 
Natapoff, supra note 266, at 1769–70. 
382.  347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
383.  See Bernstein, supra note 356, at 1253, 1257–61. 
384.  Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499. 
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type of scrutiny.385 Together, substantive due process and equal protection 
guarantees can have synergistic effects, but precisely how they should be 
balanced, if at all, in adjudicating the right to education bids further 
research and consideration.386 Nevertheless, I suspect that the lodestar for 
the analysis is the right’s protection function in securing children’s liberty 
and equality. 
 
385.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2623 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting majority opinion 
seemingly fails to follow “anything resembling [the] usual framework for deciding equal protection 
cases,” i.e., tiered scrutiny). 
386.  See Kelly Thompson Cochran, Comment, Beyond School Financing: Defining the 
Constitutional Right to an Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L. REV. 399, 442–44 (2000) (contending that 
traditional substantive due process and equal protection analysis would be ill-suited for adjudicating 
constitutional right to education and suggesting some alternatives). 
